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

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Introduction to the study of military history. 2d ed., enl. & rev.

Canada. National Defence, Dept. of.
" General Staff. Historical Section

Introduction to the Study of

MILITARY HISTORY

for Canadian Students

✦

Prepared by

HISTORICAL SECTION, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

Second Edition, Enlarged and Revised

✦

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

OTTAWA, 1952

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PREFACE

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY

This pamphlet is designed to provide an introduction to the study of military history suitable for Canadian students and particularly for members of the Canadian Officers Training Corps.

It is not intended to provide in itself a completely adequate account of the subject, but merely to supplement other books such as Colonel A. H. Burne's *The Art of War on Land*. Books by British and American authors usually take little account of Canadian aspects of military history, and while it is obviously desirable that Canadian students should not limit their knowledge of the subject to Canadian campaigns, it is equally important that they should know something of the military history of their own country. This pamphlet, accordingly, offers six examples of campaigns of Canadian interest chosen from different periods of history. These have already been published in the *Canadian Army Journal*.

The comments on these campaigns are presented mainly in terms of the usually accepted Principles of War. Those principles, in the form adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, are printed as an appendix. Another appendix offers definitions of a few military terms with which the student requires to be familiar. A very brief list of books for further reading is also included.

Some knowledge of military history is an essential part of any officer's education. It is unnecessary to labour the argument. There has been no great modern commander who has not been in some degree a student of war; and while it might be argued that changing conditions and changing weapons reduce the value of the study of the campaigns of the past, the fact remains that the fundamental problems and principles of military leadership do not change as a result of technological advances. The Principles of War can be illustrated from ancient as well as modern campaigns. There is in fact no campaign, of whatever date, from which something cannot be learned concerning the behaviour of human beings at war.

The intelligent officer will not of course expect the study of history to provide him with formulas to overcome every situation that may confront him. An officer who tries to solve his problems by consciously searching the histori-

cal precedents will not have a long career. Nevertheless, the judicious study of history can be an essential aid even in tactical or administrative matters. This is particularly the case, naturally, with *recent* history. Many lessons have been learned over and over again, at unnecessary cost in lives, simply because of neglect of the experience of the past.

It is not in matters of tactical detail, however, that military history makes its main contribution to the education of a soldier. The historical study of military institutions and campaigns is an admirable method of training and conditioning the mind for the solution of the problems of the present and the future. By thoughtfully reading the records of the campaigns and great captains of the past the modern soldier can discover the qualities of mind and heart which go to the making of a great commander, and can thereby prepare himself for his own future tasks. "Providence", says Colonel G. F. R. Henderson in his life of Stonewall Jackson, "is more inclined to side with the big brains than with the big battalions." Jackson's own career is evidence that the best means of training the intellect for the larger problems of command is the study of past wars.

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SIR WILLIAM PHIPS' ATTACK ON QUEBEC

1690

The campaign that took place around the infant city of Quebec in the autumn of 1690 is a small episode in Canadian history but not without significance. It was one of the earliest occasions when the military forces of Canada were in action on a considerable scale. Although a fairly large force of French regulars was present, the actual fighting was almost all done by Canadian militiamen under their own officers. And there are definite military lessons to be learned even from these minor actions which took place over two and a half centuries ago.

The Background of the Attack

The year 1689 saw the beginning of the series of conflicts between Britain and France which is sometimes called the Second Hundred Years' War. In that year the War of the League of Augsburg (called by Americans King William's War) broke out in Europe. Inevitably it was fought on the western as well as the eastern side of the Atlantic, and French and English colonists were soon at each other's throats in a struggle which was embittered by the religious hatreds existing between Puritan New England and Roman Catholic New France.

It was fortunate for the French colony that this same year 1689 saw the return as Governor of the old but formidable veteran Count Frontenac,* perhaps the stoutest defender it ever had. During the winter of 1689–90 Frontenac sent out three war parties over the snow against the frontiers of the English colonies. The blows struck by these expeditions goaded New England and New York into making a great effort to clear the French from America. In 1690 they produced a grand design for an attack upon New France and in particular upon the centre of French power, the town of Quebec.

The English colonies were far stronger than New France in population and in wealth. Luckily for the French, however, the English were disunited and full of mutual jealousy. In these circumstances, the courage, sound leadership and effective organization of the French community enabled it to resist its aggressive and

*He was now 69. He had served a previous term as Governor, 1672–82.

numerous neighbours not only in 1690, but for two generations afterwards. Its autocratic system of government, while certainly adverse to the progress of the colony in the long run, was favourable to military efficiency. When at last New France fell it was not the American colonies that conquered it, but a great armament dispatched from England, backed and transported by the Royal Navy.

The English colonies' plan for the campaign of 1690 was conceived on lines similar to those followed with success seventy years later; but the military resources of the colonies at this time were unequal to carrying out such a great conception. The intention was to make a double attack. A land expedition was to move up the line of the Hudson River and Lake Champlain against Montreal; while, simultaneously, a seaborne force was to sail up the St. Lawrence and attack Quebec. The command of this latter enterprise was given to Sir William Phips, a "rude sailor" who owed his reputation and his knighthood to his success in salvaging the cargo of a wrecked Spanish treasure galleon, and had little military experience. Phips' attempt to carry out the scheme produced one of the most dramatic episodes in the early history of Canada.

Frontenac Prepares for Defence

Count Frontenac, anticipating the attack, had taken steps to strengthen Quebec. At this time the place was far from being the fortress which it later became. There was a small fort in the Upper Town and a few guns mounted; and the cliffs gave the town good natural protection on two of its three sides, fronting the St. Lawrence and St. Charles rivers. But the side looking south and west towards the open country was completely unprotected, and Frontenac now fortified it for the first time. The defences which he provided here consisted of "palisades and small stone redoubts at intervals;" they were obviously not much more than fieldworks. They did not enclose any part of the great hump of Cape Diamond, the site of the modern Citadel, on which there were no buildings at this time. Frontenac says in his report that he felt "un pressentiment" that it was very important to get on with this work, and it was nearly finished when on 31 July 1690 the Governor left Quebec for Montreal, evidently to take measures to resist the expected overland attack. As it turned out, the English expedition against Montreal came to practically nothing. Internal quarrels among the colonists themselves and inadequate preparations combined with a timely onslaught of smallpox to defeat it. The main body never got beyond Lake George, and the only blow struck was a hit-and-run raid by a

small party on La Prairie, across the St. Lawrence from Montreal, on 4 September.

Phips' expedition by sea was a more formidable threat. However, it was launched far too late in the season. Phips had devoted the spring to a successful expedition against Port Royal in Acadia; and the Quebec enterprise was held up in the hope of getting help, in the form of arms and ammunition, from the home government in England. But that government was fighting a war in Ireland, and sent no assistance. Only on 9 August did Phips' fleet finally set sail from Hull, near Boston. It consisted of from 30 to 34 ships (different accounts vary slightly) with more than 2000 men on board. The troops were Massachusetts militia; the ships were not war vessels, and only four of them were of any size. Unlike the later colonial expedition which took Louisbourg in 1745, this one got no assistance from the Royal Navy; and no British regular troops were involved. At this period, although France maintained an effective regular force in Canada, the only English troops in America were a few inefficient independent garrison companies. Both French and English colonies had militia systems based on the obligation of universal service.

Phips made a very slow voyage. He was hampered, in his own words, "by bad weather and contrary winds," and had no pilot to show him the way up the St. Lawrence. He arrived at Tadoussac on 3 October. (The English called this date 23 September, for they were still using the Old Style calendar.) The squadron did not reach the Isle of Orleans until 15 October, and it anchored close below Quebec only on the 16th. This dilatory approach had robbed Phips of his best hope of an easy victory, for when he entered the river Frontenac was still in Montreal. On 10 October a report that a hostile fleet had sailed from Boston led him to set out for Quebec. The next day he heard that the enemy ships had actually been sighted in the St. Lawrence. Frontenac paused just long enough to send orders to Callières, the Governor of Montreal, to follow him to Quebec with all his troops except a small garrison, and to collect as many as possible of the militia on the way; then he pushed on by canoe, through a violent storm, to the capital. He reached it on the morning of 14 October, when Phips was still seven leagues away.

Frontenac's arrival raised the spirits of garrison and people, and he himself tells how "la résolution et la gayeté" shone in the faces of the inhabitants as they made their preparations. The Governor was delighted to find that during the past few days the Town Major of Quebec, Prévost, had greatly improved the

batteries and other defences. A map prepared, probably the following year, by the engineer Robert de Villeneuve indicates that, all told, there were 23 cannon mounted by the time Phips appeared. Six of these were in two batteries in the Lower Town, and three were emplaced to cover the crossing of the St. Charles River. Quebec was still not especially strong, but it was stronger now than ever before; and with nearly 3000 fighters to defend it, as it had after Callières came marching down St. Louis Street with his merry men from the upper country on the evening of 17 October, it proved more than equal to beating off the amateur warriors of New England.

Phips Before Quebec

On the morning of the 16th took place the famous episode of the flag of truce. Phips sent to Frontenac a letter (carefully composed by the expedition's four chaplains) demanding the surrender of Quebec. The messenger was one Major Thomas Savage.* The New England accounts call him "young Thomas Savage," evidently to distinguish him from his father, another Major Thomas Savage, for he was a man of 50. The reception he got is a part of Canadian legend, but unlike many legends it is fully supported by the evidence of the people who were there. The emissary, blindfolded, was led up to Fort St. Louis, where he found himself, as reported later in a letter written by James Lloyd, a Boston merchant, "in a stately Hall full of brave Martiall men." He proceeded to present the ultimatum, which demanded an answer within an hour. But the menaces concocted by the Puritan men of God did not have the effect Phips had hoped for. Frontenac told Savage proudly that he would not keep him waiting as long as an hour; he did not recognize the new King (William III) in whose name the English came; and neither he nor his officers had any intention of surrendering Quebec. When Savage asked for a written answer, the Governor made the haughty reply that has been familiar to generations of schoolboys: "No! I have no answer for your General save from the mouths of my cannon and from my musketry; let him learn that this is not the way to summon a man like me. Let him do his best, and I shall do mine." The New Englander was taken back to his boat and reported to his commander. If Lloyd is to be believed, Frontenac's bold attitude "startled" Phips' men, for they had been "preached to other things."

However, an English council of war had prepared, or now prepared,

**The letter has been preserved and is published in Parkman. Although Savage wrote an account of the campaign, which has also been preserved, he makes no mention of his mission to Frontenac. His impressions of the incident would have been interesting!*


THE ATTACK ON QUEBEC
1690
Based on a contemporary map by Robert de Villeneuve
Cannon shown thus:
North
ST. LAWRENCE RIVER
Beauport
Lower Town
Cape Diamond
Site of present Citadel
QUEBEC
Upper Town
English Landing
La Canardière
Ford
Ford
St. Charles River
Tadoussac
Isle of Orleans
St. Lawrence R.
Quebec
Montreal
Lake Champlain
Lake George
Hudson R.
Boston
New York
Historical Section, G.S.

a plan of attack, which is described both by Savage and by Major John Walley, the second-in-command of the expedition. Like the planners of the raid on Dieppe in 1942, the Massachusetts men confronted a fortified town and a formidable coast; like them, they were faced with the choice between a frontal attack and encirclement from the flanks; and like them they tried to combine the two. The scheme adopted was to land the main body of the troops on the section of the Beauport shore called La Canardière, across the St. Charles east of the city. The landing force was then to advance across the St. Charles, which was fordable, with the help of the fleet's boats, which were also to bring in the field guns and land them on the Quebec side of the St. Charles. Walley writes:

> . . . it was alsoe agreed that, when we were over the river, the men of warr were to sail up with the town, and when they perceived we were upon the hill, especially if we then fired a house, they were then to land 200 men under their guns, and were to make a brisk and resolute charge to enter the town; alsoe agreed that Shute and others of the larger vessels that were not men of warr, were to go beyond the town, that the enemy might think we had another army to land there . . .

The weakness of this plan was that it was too complicated for the untrained and inexperienced forces that had to carry it out. It required a degree of co-ordination between the force afloat and that ashore to which the New Englanders' discipline was not equal.

The Fighting on Shore

The English continued to act slowly. Nothing was done on the 16th, and on the 17th bad weather prevented a landing. Finally, on the 18th, the militia were put ashore on La Canardière without meeting any immediate resistance. Major Walley, who commanded the landing force, says that it numbered between 1200 and 1300 men.

Count Frontenac had a definite plan, which he outlines in his dispatch to the Minister of Marine. Although he had three French regular battalions he did not propose to send them into the broken country beyond the St. Charles. This area, he says, was "impracticable for large bodies of troops, because of the woods, the rocks and the mud [of the foreshore] . . . and suitable only for little platoons skirmishing in the Indian way, which our soldiers are not capable of doing." Frontenac was obviously no Braddock. But he had other troops well fitted for guerrilla work—"our Canadian officers and other volunteers, and the people of the country, along with those French officers and soldiers who had already become used to this sort of thing." Among the "Canadian officers" present were at least two of the eleven famous LeMoyne brothers, native Canadians who deserve a high place on the roster of Canadian fighting men. One of them, Jacques, Sieur de

Sainte-Hélène—the Seigneur of St. Helen's Island—was to be the great hero of the defence. Frontenac planned to use his local irregulars to harass the New England landing party. His main battle, however, he intended to fight on the open ground on the Quebec side of the St. Charles, which was more suitable for European tactics. The river could be forded only at low water, and Frontenac hoped that the New Englanders would come at him across it. Then, with the stream rising behind them, he planned to attack them with his brigade of regulars, drive them downhill into the St. Charles and destroy them completely. It was a sound plan, designed to make the best use of the forces at Frontenac's disposal; but as it turned out the invaders never made enough progress to give him the chance to put it fully into operation.

When Walley's men landed Frontenac sent out the militia of Montreal and Three Rivers, under Ste-Hélène, to help the Beauport men and the local Indians harry them. As soon as the English began to move inland they came under fire from among the trees and bushes, and although they advanced some distance they lost fairly heavily (according to Walley, four killed and not less than 60 wounded) and soon camped for the night. They expected the ships' boats to come in with the tide before dawn to help them cross the St. Charles, but they were disappointed, the shipmasters blaming the wind for the failure. But the six cannon, which the plan required should be put ashore west of the St. Charles, were prematurely landed, without Walley being warned, close to his camp. He had no means of getting them across the river.

Phips' whole scheme was falling apart. There is no evidence that the proposed feint above the town was ever made; and on the evening of the 18th Phips himself took action quite contrary to the plan. The four large ships, not waiting for Walley's men to cross the St. Charles, moved up the river, anchored before Quebec and opened fire. The batteries replied, and firing went on until after dark. Early the next morning the cannonade was resumed. The ships went in close ("within musquett shott," says Phips) and the six big guns in the Lower Town bore the brunt of the action. Ste-Hélène had come back to the city and was laying the guns in one of the batteries. The English were forced to break off the action on the 19th after several hours' firing, when their ships, and particularly Phips' flagship, the *Six Friends*, had been seriously damaged. They had shot away most of their scanty supply of ammunition without doing much harm to the solid stone

buildings of Quebec or inflicting any casualties worth mentioning.

In the meantime, the New England landing force had remained inactive and made no attempt to exploit such diversion as the bombardment provided. The men suffered greatly from cold (winter was coming on early) and lack of essential supplies (the shortage of rum seems to have been the main complaint); and there was smallpox in the camp. The fleet's boats still did not come; and on the night of the 19th a council of war decided to recommend that the force re-embark on the night of the 20th, with a view to making another attack elsewhere after the troops were refreshed. On the morning of the 20th Walley went aboard the flagship and Phips reluctantly agreed to the suggestion.

On this day there was another skirmish. According to Monseignat, the author of one of the best French accounts, in the afternoon the English vanguard was seen marching along the bank of the St. Charles as though intending to cross. Frontenac now moved his regular battalions out to his chosen ground, formed them in order of battle and placed himself at their head. But the battle for which he had set the stage never took place. No Englishman crossed the St. Charles. The incredibly active Ste-Hélène was now back on the Beauport side, leading and inspiring the Canadian skirmishers who were engaged with the head of the English column. This was his last fight, for in it he received a mortal wound from a musket ball. His brother Longueuil was wounded in the same affair, in which the French lost two other men killed.

The English boats came in shortly before dawn, but there was so little darkness left and his men were in such confusion that Walley thought it best to put off the evacuation until the next night. There was further minor fighting on the 21st, with Walley sending out parties of skirmishers to hold the French back. That night the boats appeared again, and the English force was evacuated without interference from the French, whose outposts did not even discover what was going on. Perhaps they would have done better if Ste-Hélène had still been on his feet. The English, as the result of some misunderstanding, left five of their six guns behind them. Lloyd quaintly says that they hoped to recover them next day, "but by that time they spoake ffrench."

Frontenac had probably failed to fathom the enemy's intention to make an immediate evacuation. He had missed an opportunity for offensive action which might have wiped out the landing force. It seems likely that in any case he continued to feel that his European troops were unfitted to an offensive movement in

broken country, and feared that any attempt to use them in this manner might produce a disaster. He preferred to sit tight.

The English attempted nothing more. A council of war on the 22nd did not finally decide to abandon the attack, although many of the officers argued that their men were unfit for action, sickness being rampant. But on the 23rd and 24th an exchange of prisoners was arranged and effected, and the New England fleet then dropped down the river on its way back to Boston. Some of the ships never reached home, and many men who had survived the fighting died on the voyage. The failure of the expedition was a painful blow to Massachusetts, who had spent a great deal of money on fitting it out and was now obliged for the first time in her history to resort to an issue of paper currency. While Boston mourned, Quebec rejoiced. But the English retreat had come none too soon, for New France was short of food, and with almost all the able-bodied men in the country assembled at Quebec there would soon have been no way of feeding them.

Comments

The French had reason to be proud of the manner in which they had met and repulsed the attack, but much of the explanation for the victory lies in the inefficiency of the New England force. The great Bostonian historian Parkman penned in 1877 what may be regarded as the best possible commentary: "Massachusetts had made her usual mistake. She had confidently believed that ignorance and inexperience could match the skill of a tried veteran, and that the rude courage of her fishermen and farmers could triumph without discipline or leadership . . . A trading republic, without trained officers, may win victories; but it wins them either by accident, or by an extravagant outlay in money and life."

Frontenac's defensive measures were well calculated. As we have said, the only serious allegation that can be made against him is that of over-caution. He repulsed the enemy, but because he did not feel equal to taking the offensive he did not destroy him. It must be said in Frontenac's favour that with the season so far advanced (when Phips appeared it was over a month later than the date of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759) the Governor had only to hold his position for a limited time, and the approach of winter would then inevitably drive the invaders away. All the same, he had a larger force than Phips', and it was of better quality; and he had an opportunity, by running some risk, to strike a most telling blow at the English in America. We can admire his realistic recognition of the

shortcomings of European-trained troops in American warfare; but did he not, perhaps, overdo it?

It may seem almost ludicrous to discuss this small episode, which sometimes verges on the comic, in terms of the Principles of War. Nevertheless, in this as in every action the operation of those principles can be observed.

The static defensive measures of Frontenac and Prévost made ample and most useful provision for *Security;* what was lacking in the French operations in the final phase was the *Offensive Action* which might so usefully have been launched from this firm base. The failure of the English to implement effectively their plan for a double attack enabled Frontenac to effect at Quebec a *Concentration of Force* which made their success there virtually impossible. This concentration was facilitated in turn by the *Flexibility* conferred upon the French by their possession of easy and rapid water communications, by way of the St. Lawrence, from one end of the colony to the other.

The English colonists, on the other hand, seem to have sinned against almost every sound principle of action that has ever been enunciated. Notably, the slowness of their proceedings at every point deprived them of all chance of achieving that *Surprise* which was their best hope of victory. Not entirely through the fault of the colonial planners, their *Administration* was inadequate; the expedition was launched without being provided with the supplies essential to success. The spirit of *Co-operation* was sadly lacking within the New England force, with the results that might have been expected. Finally, as the consequence of many circumstances, but mainly the absence of energetic, determined and informed leadership, it seems clear that the *Morale* of the expedition declined steadily from the moment when it arrived before the enemy. The New Englanders were fortunate not to suffer a worse disaster than the one that actually befell them.

Books on the Campaign

Francis Parkman, *Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV* (Boston, 1877 and later editions). (Still the best general account.)

Gerald S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic* (Toronto, 1950), Chap. IV.

(*Note:* The foregoing narrative is based mainly upon documents contained in Ernest Myrand, *1690: Sir William Phips devant Québec* (Quebec, 1893) and W. K. Watkins, *Soldiers in the Expedition to Canada in 1690* (Boston, 1898). There are additional documents in *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1689-1692* (London, 1901); and James Lloyd's letter is in the *Report* of the Public Archives of Canada, 1912. The chief French official reports, transcribed from the French archives, are in Public Archives of Canada, Series C 11A, vol. 11.)

THE DEFENCE OF UPPER CANADA

1812

The Principles of War can be illustrated by small campaigns as well as great, and by old campaigns as well as those of our own times. It would be difficult to find a series of operations providing a much better object lesson than those of 1812 in which Major-General Sir Isaac Brock defeated the attempt of superior United States forces to conquer the Province of Upper Canada. This campaign, fought nearly a century and a half ago against an adversary who is now our fast friend and essential ally, will repay study by anyone seeking enlightenment as to the qualities that make a great commander.

The Situation at the Outbreak of War

When the United States declared war in June 1812, General Brock was in command of the forces in Upper Canada and was also temporarily administering the civil government of the province. The military problem that faced him was one of extreme difficulty, for the force at his disposal was very small and the boundary line to be defended was very long.

There was only one British regiment of the line in Upper Canada—the 1st Battalion of the 41st (now the Welch Regiment). There was also a considerable detachment of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, another of the Royal Newfoundland Fencibles (chiefly employed as marines on the Lakes) and a few artillerymen. Behind these regular forces stood the provincial Militia, which was simply the men of military age organized in paper battalions on a basis of universal service, and at the outbreak of war virtually without training. A considerably larger British force, including five battalions of the line, was stationed in Lower Canada. All

told, the two Canadas (now Ontario and Quebec) were defended by roughly 7000 troops fit to be considered regulars; of these, only a little over 1600 were in the upper province.

The United States Government had of course a relatively tremendous reservoir of manpower to draw upon, but its regular army was small. Though the establishment when war broke out was more than 35,000 all ranks, the actual strength was much less. The total number of regulars serving may have been in the vicinity of 13,000. Moreover, a large proportion of these were very recent recruits, and the effective force was certainly not superior to the British regulars in the Canadas alone. During the war, the United States called into service over 450,000 militiamen; but the average efficiency of these citizen soldiers, as events on the battlefield amply showed, was decidedly low.

The greater part of the British force had, however, to be retained in Lower Canada, for strategically this was the most important part of the country. Had the Americans followed a sound line of operations, they would have concentrated against Montreal, using the excellent communications available by Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River. The capture of Montreal would have severed the essential line of communication—that by the St. Lawrence—on which the defence of Upper Canada entirely depended, and the whole of that province would have fallen into their hands at an early date. The Americans, however, instead of acting in this manner, operated mainly against the frontier of Upper Canada, chopping at the upper branches of the tree instead of the trunk or the roots. In a long view this was fortunate, but it meant that the first shock of their attack had to be met by very inadequate British forces.

In the first months of the war, however, the defenders had one decided advantage: they possessed a distinct naval superiority on the Great Lakes. This was due to the existence of the force known as the Provincial Marine of Upper Canada. In a naval sense this force was very inefficient (it was primarily a transport service and was administered by the Quartermaster-General's Department of the Army); but its armed vessels were superior to anything possessed by the Americans on the Lakes in the beginning, and it was in great part responsible for the preservation of Upper Canada in the first campaign. It must be noted that at this time the land communications of the province were extremely primitive, the roads being very few and very bad. Only by water could troops be moved with any speed.

Against this advantage we must



Historical Section C.S.

balance a disadvantage. A large proportion of the population of Upper Canada were recent immigrants from the United States, people who could not be expected to come forward to repel an American invasion. Many other Upper Canadians, though loyal enough in a passive way, considered that the Americans' superiority in physical strength made defence useless. In view of the Canadian schoolbook legend of 1812, it may come as a surprise to some people to know that in July Brock wrote to the Adjutant General at Headquarters in Lower Canada as follows:

> My situation is most critical, not from anything the enemy can do, but from the disposition of the people — The population, believe me is essentially bad — A full belief possesses them all that this Province must inevitably succumb — This prepossession is fatal to every exertion — Legislators, Magistrates, Militia Officers, all, have imbibed the idea, and are so sluggish and indifferent in all their respective offices that the artful and active scoundrel is allowed to parade the Country without interruption, and commit all imaginable mischief. . .
>
> What a change an additional regiment would make in this part of the Province!* Most of the people have lost all confidence — I however speak loud and look big. . .

No commentary upon the campaign of 1812 should overlook this element in the situation. With greatly superior forces assembling on the frontier, and with the morale of the population (which was largely identical with the Militia) at such a low ebb, many a commander would have adopted a supine defensive attitude. It was the greatness of Brock that, far from allowing these circumstances to discourage him, he realized that the best hope of carrying out his task successfully lay in assuming a vigorous local offensive.

The First Blow: Michilimackinac

A matter of great importance to the salvation of Canada was the attitude of the Indians on both sides of the border, particularly in the west. In view of the great disparity between the white populations of Canada and of the United States, and the thinness of the western population on both sides, the behaviour of the Indian tribes was likely to be decisive. If they were friendly to the Americans, or even neutral, Upper Canada would be much more difficult to defend. If their active aid could be enlisted for the British cause, the province's chances would be very much better.

All this was very clear to General Brock, and as early as December 1811 he emphasized it in a letter to Sir George Prevost, the Governor General and Commander of the Forces, remarking, "before we can expect an active co-operation on the part of the Indians, the reduction of Detroit and Michilimackinac, must convince that People . . . that we

* *Another regiment, the 49th, was sent to Upper Canada in August.*

are earnestly engaged in the War". He had thus formed, well in advance of the outbreak of war, the elements of a plan. Upper Canada was to be defended by a series of offensive strokes with limited objectives, which would have the special advantage of influencing the Indians to take the British side. On learning that the United States had declared war, Brock sent instructions to Capt. Charles Roberts, commanding the small British post at distant St. Joseph Island, near Sault Ste. Marie, giving him discretion as to whether to stand on the defensive or to attack the American garrison at Michilimackinac. Roberts decided to attack, and on 16 July, the day after he received these orders, he embarked his few regulars and a body of Canadian fur-traders and Indians (a little over 500 men in all) and led them against Mackinac. The British seized the heights commanding the fort and dragged up a gun; and the American commander, who had had no information of his country's declaration of war, had no choice but surrender. This early and bloodless success brought the neighbouring tribes flocking to the British standard, and it had a great influence, accordingly, on the subsequent events on the Detroit frontier.

On this frontier the Americans launched their first offensive. Brigadier-General William Hull, an old and inefficient officer, had advanced from the interior of Ohio before the declaration of war, with some 2500 men; and on 11 July he crossed the Detroit River and invaded Canada. The small British force on that frontier did not resist his crossing—which considerably displeased Brock; but Hull took no active steps to dislodge it, and it continued to hold the fort at Amherstburg and the territory around it, a constant threat on the American's flank.

The British naval superiority now made itself felt. The last 60 miles of Hull's line of communications running back to Ohio lay along the shores of Lake Erie and the Detroit River, and was always exposed to interruption by an enemy having control of the water. Hull twice sent detachments back to "open the communication"; both were cut up, by British Indians under Tecumseh and troops from Amherstburg, in engagements on 5 and 9 August. The Provincial Marine had previously captured a schooner carrying Hull's official correspondence. More mail was captured in the fight on the 5th. The American general was easily discouraged. He began to withdraw from Canada to Detroit on 7 August, and completed the withdrawal on the 11th.

The Capture of Detroit

General Brock with his small forces

could not take the offensive at any point on the frontier without leaving other points unguarded, and had the Americans been enterprising and efficient his situation would have been impossible. As it was, his own first move was to the Niagara frontier, where he contemplated an attack on Fort Niagara. However, he did not attempt this, arguing that it was more important to get on with training the militia; and the Americans made no immediate offensive move in this sector. Brock then returned to York (now Toronto), the provincial capital, for the session of the legislature. This gave him an opportunity, in his civil capacity, of addressing himself to the province and giving a strong lead to its people, so many of whom were uncertain and disheartened.

By the time the Assembly was prorogued, it was clear that for the moment the main threat to Upper Canada was on the Detroit frontier. Brock immediately launched a vigorous counter-offensive. Hull's invasion and a bombastic proclamation which he had issued had considerably discouraged the Canadian militia along the Detroit; but when Brock asked those assembled at York for volunteers to march against the invaders, more came forward than transport could be found for. The general had already ordered a small regular reinforcement to Amherstburg. He had tried to organize a force to operate on the Thames, but this had been largely frustrated by the unwillingness of the militia in the nearby districts. He now dispatched 100 militiamen from York to the Long Point district on Lake Erie. At that place, he wrote to Prevost on 29 July, "I propose collecting a force for the relief of Amherstburg."

On the night of 5 August, the same day on which he prorogued the Assembly, Brock himself sailed from York for the head of Lake Ontario. Pushing rapidly on overland to Port Dover, he found the relief force awaiting him there, along with boats to carry them up Lake Erie. (Colonel Thomas Talbot, the redoubtable founder of the Talbot Settlement, had had considerable difficulty with the militia of the district, but had finally obtained a fair number of volunteers.) On the 8th Brock embarked his tiny "mass of manœuvre", which amounted in all to about 50 regulars and 250 militia with one 6-pounder, and, coasting along the lake shore, reached Amherstburg and made a junction with the British force there on the night of 13 August. Bad weather and bad boats had delayed the movement, which nevertheless seems very rapid in the existing circumstances.

The general immediately divided his whole force into three miniature "brigades", two consisting of militia

stiffened by small regular detachments and the third of the main body of the 41st Regiment. On 15 August orders were issued for crossing the Detroit and moving against the American army.

Few officers would care to cross a broad river with the prospect of attacking on the farther shore a force twice as strong as their own in a fortified position. Brock himself recorded afterwards that his colonels advised against it. The general, however, was taking a "calculated risk". The captured correspondence had told him how low was the Americans' morale and how discouraged their commander, and the very fact of their retreat from Canadian territory had further emphasized the poor state of their army. Even so, his decision remains a fine example of the offensive spirit which wins battles.*

On the evening of 15 August Brock opened fire upon Fort Detroit with five guns which had been emplaced on the Canadian shore. The bombardment inflicted some casualties and further discouraged the Americans; Brock had made a judicious contribution to the disintegration of poor Hull by sending him a demand for surrender which remarked that, while he did not intend to "join in a war of extermination," the Indians would "be beyond controul the moment the contest commences"; and soon after daylight on the 16th the little British force crossed the river in boats and landed three miles below Detroit. The army consisted of some 700 white troops, of whom 400 were militia, and 600 Indians, with five small field guns. The battery opposite Detroit was served on this day by gunners landed from the Provincial Marine. Although Brock does not mention it, Hull in his apologia emphasizes that the British landed "under cover of their ships of war", and it is clear that co-operation between the land forces and the Marine was close throughout.

Brock had planned to take up a strong position and trust to the effect of his artillery fire to compel Hull to come out and meet him in the open field. He now received information, however, that a detachment of 500 men had left Detroit three days before and that their cavalry were

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* *Brock's own account of his appreciation of the situation has been preserved: "Some say that nothing could be more desperate than the measure, but I answer that the state of the Province admitted of nothing but desperate remedies. I got possession of the letters my antagonist addressed to the Secretary at War, and also of the sentiments which hundreds of his army uttered to their friends. Confidence in the General was gone, and evident despondency prevailed throughout. I have succeeded beyond expectation. I crossed the river contrary to the opinion of Cols. Procter, St. George, etc.; it is therefore no wonder that envy should attribute to good fortune what in justice to my own discernment, I must say, proceeded from a cool calculation of the* pours *and* contres." (Brock to his brothers, 3 September 1812.)

only three miles in rear of his own force. He accordingly took another bold decision—to make an immediate assault upon Detroit. The troops advanced upon the fort, but before the attack could begin the American commander sent forward a flag of truce and proposed a discussion of terms. The sequel was the surrender within an hour of Hull's whole army (including the detachment above referred to), with 35 guns and a great quantity of other arms and stores.

Thus General Brock had won a resounding victory and entirely removed the menace to the western frontier, almost without firing a shot. Well might he write to the Commander-in-Chief, "When I detail my good fortune Your Excellency will be astonished." There was, however, more than good fortune to thank for what had happened. The energy and boldness with which Brock himself had acted were the chief causes of this extraordinary result.

On Hull's own showing, it was the vulnerability of his communications (constantly exposed to interruption as a result of the British control of the water), and the fear of the Indians, that induced him to his ignominious surrender. As he put it, the loss of Mackinac had "opened the northern hive of Indians" and the expectation of the upper tribes "swarming down" upon his army went far to take the heart out of him. What the success at Mackinac had done in the case of the Indians the capture of Detroit may be said to have done among the white population of Upper Canada. This brilliant victory silenced the croakers and encouraged loyal citizens.* Canadians now realized that a successful defence of the country was quite possible. The militiamen whom so many had considered dupes suddenly became saviours and heroes, and before the year 1812 was over the Canadian legend that attributes the savings of the country primarily to the militia was already well on the way to establishment.

The Final Phase of the Campaign

Having saved the situation in the west, Brock handed over the forces there to a subordinate and rushed back east; he arrived at Fort George on the Niagara eight days after Detroit surrendered. For a time operations were suspended as the result of an armistice negotiated by Prevost, and during this period the United States brought up additional strength to the Niagara frontier.

On 13 October the Americans collected here began to cross into Canada at Queenston. Brock, with characteristic energy and offensive

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* "*The militia have been inspired by the recent success with confidence — the disaffected are silenced.*" (Brock to his brothers, 3 September 1812).

spirit, galloped to the spot; and in leading the small force on the ground against the Americans, who had gained the summit of the escarpment, he fell in action. He never knew that the capture of Detroit had brought him a knighthood. His successor, General Sheaffe, collected all available troops and destroyed the invading force later in the day, winning a victory which further raised the spirits of the people of Upper Canada. In November another incompetent American commander made a gesture at invasion on the Niagara above the Falls, but this came to nothing. The campaigning season ended with no part of Upper Canada held by the Americans, and with an important section of the territory of Michigan in British occupation.

Although the war went on for two more years, the worst danger to Upper Canada had passed in 1812. In that year, when the British forces were so small and the morale of the population so low, the Americans had their great opportunity. That they failed to profit by it was due partly to their own unpreparedness, but to a large extent also it was due to Isaac Brock.

Comments

Although Canadian histories have rarely recognized this, the successful defence of Upper Canada was due in great part to the fact that the province was better prepared for war than the United States. The latter had a great superiority in numbers and physical power, but their power was not organized. The Mother Country had provided in Canada the elements of organized power which the Americans largely lacked: a naval force equal to controlling the Lakes and their connecting rivers; a small but efficient body of regular troops; and trained officers capable of skilful and energetic leadership. The forces were tiny, but in the circumstances they were enough.

There have been few campaigns in which the vision, energy and decision of a commander have been more influential than in this one of 1812. The manner in which Brock rose superior to discouragements which a lesser man would have used as excuses for inactivity may serve as an object lesson to every officer who would learn the arts of command.

Most if not all of the Principles of War as they are defined today could be illustrated from this campaign. We will mention only some which seem to appear in it with special clarity.

The whole campaign exemplifies in a particularly striking manner the importance of *Maintenance of Morale.* It was in great part superior morale that enabled Brock's force to impose upon and overcome Hull's; and this

superiority in morale was mainly the result of bold and effective leadership. In turn, the victory at Detroit itself gave a fillip to Canadian morale generally which made the continued defence of the country possible. There has never been a better illustration of Lord Montgomery's remark, "High morale is a pearl of very great price. And the surest way to obtain it is by success in battle."

It would be difficult also to adduce a better example of the dividends to be gained from *Offensive Action*. In spite of the odds against him, Brock saw the importance of seizing the initiative from the enemy and taking the offensive; and the results which he obtained should be an inspiration to every commander who is faced by superior forces.

Similarly, we see in this campaign a successful application of the principles of *Concentration of Force* and *Economy of Effort*. Brock could not concentrate *material* force superior to that of the enemy, but he did concentrate all the force he had the means to move. Of his superiority in *moral* force, there is no need to speak further. His resources were slender, but he employed them judiciously and produced at the decisive time and place a concentration which proved equal to the task. His operations also illustrate the principle of *Flexibility*. British naval superiority on the Lakes conferred upon him "physical mobility of a high order", enabling him to use his limited resources to the best advantage. The manner in which he was able to shuttle his forces freely and rapidly back and forth along the long frontier they had to guard compensated, to a considerable extent, for the forces' smallness, and made a great contribution to the saving of Upper Canada in this campaign.

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(Note: The foregoing narrative is based on documents contained in E. Cruikshank, *Documents relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812* (Ottawa, 1913), the same author's *Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1812* (Welland, n.d.) and W. Wood, *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (Toronto, 3 vols. in 4, 1920–28)).

THE CAPTURE OF VIMY RIDGE

1917

On the summit of Vimy Ridge in Northern France, far-seen across the surrounding plains, stands the greatest of Canada's European war memorials. It commemorates one of the most resounding British tactical triumphs of the First World War, and one of the most famous victories of the Canadian Army. In plain and rugged words the inscription tells the visitor the story: "The Canadian Corps, on April 9th, 1917, with four divisions in line on a front of four miles attacked and captured this ridge."

Vimy Ridge is worthy of attention because it is perhaps the most celebrated Canadian battle of 1914–18. It is also, however, an episode from which the soldier can learn much—an outstanding example of a successful "set-piece" attack against formidable prepared positions.

Allied and Enemy Plans for 1917

The year 1916 had seen both Allies and Germans suffer tremendous losses on the Western Front, especially at Verdun and on the Somme, without breaking the deadlock which trench warfare had imposed upon a battlefield stretching from the Swiss border to the North Sea. The year 1917 was to see great changes in the opposing orders of battle. The United States entered the war in April, but many months were to pass before it could make its strength felt effectively in Europe. Russia underwent a revolution in March, but Kerensky's socialist Provisional Government which came to power strove to continue the war against Germany. Not until November did Lenin's Bolsheviks, in a second revolution, oust Kerensky; they then proceeded to make peace. In these circumstances, the 1917 campaign in the west witnessed another series of great battles of position, bloody and, in the strategic sense, inconclusive.

The original Allied plan to continue the Battles of the Somme during the spring of 1917 with four French and three British armies was can-

celled when General Nivelle, a comparatively junior officer, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and North East and entrusted with the overall direction of the spring operations. Instead of waging a campaign of attrition Nivelle hoped to break the enemy's will to fight by a smashing blow delivered by 46 French divisions along the Chemin des Dames (between Reims and Soissons) while diversionary attacks were mounted elsewhere on the British and French sectors. Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig agreed to extend his Fourth Army's front 25 miles southwards so that additional French divisions might be withdrawn for Nivelle's offensive, but insisted that his own more limited preliminary attack should extend as far north as Vimy Ridge. The acquisition of Vimy Ridge, in addition to securing the left flank of the operations to the south, would deprive the enemy of a valuable vantage point. The task of capturing it was assigned to the Canadian Corps of General Horne's British First Army, while General Allenby's Third Army launched the main British attack along the valley of the Scarpe.*

**The attack of the British 17th Corps between the Scarpe and the Canadian Corps boundary extended on to the lower sections of Vimy Ridge, but it is officially considered part of the First Battle of the Scarpe which, along with the Battle of Vimy Ridge, forms a portion of "The Battles of Arras, 1917."*

The Germans, who had had even heavier casualties than the Allies in 1916, had decided to conduct a defensive campaign on the Western Front during the coming year, and to attempt to bring Britain to her knees with their U-boat campaign. While the French were changing both their commander-in-chief and their plans Hindenburg and Ludendorff were trying to decide whether to shorten their front by withdrawing from two salients south of Arras and conserve the troops saved for more urgent tasks elsewhere. Moreover the Somme battles had demonstrated that the existing system of rigid defence was no longer suitable, since British artillery had been able not only to batter out of recognition the forward trench system, 400-600 yards in depth, but also neutralize the entire forward zone falling within range of its guns, to a depth of 1500-2000 yards. Therefore, towards the end of 1916 Ludendorff had introduced a new tactical doctrine, instructing infantry to fight a mobile defence in a series of zones once the lightly-held forward trenches had been overrun; even though strongpoints might momentarily be cut off, counter-attacks by special reserve formations (supported by artillery) could destroy the attackers struggling across the forward zones cratered by their own bombardment. Steps were taken, therefore, to convert the additional autho-

rized rear lines of defence into zones capable of mobile defence in depth. The formidable "Siegfried" position constructed behind the German salients became known to the Allies as the Hindenburg Line and its more northerly adjunct (the "Wotan" position) as the Drocourt-Quéant Switch. The offensive launched up the Ancre valley during January and early February by the British Fifth Army forced the Germans to yield some ground and decided them to withdraw from these salients, although not from the stronger positions further north in the valley of the Scarpe and atop Vimy Ridge. Not until mid-March, however, did they make an ordered withdrawal of nearly 20 miles into the Hindenburg Line. In accordance with a prearranged plan aptly named "Alberich" after the malicious dwarf of the Nibelung Saga, they laid waste the whole evacuated area.

The German withdrawals eliminated the possibility of a French subsidiary attack and altered the operation planned for the British Third Army. The latter was now to break through the advanced defences covering the Hindenburg Line, crack that position itself and advance towards Cambrai. If this succeeded the British Fifth Army would enlarge the frontal attack and the Cavalry Corps and the available reserve divisions would exploit. The role of the First Army remained unchanged, however, as the capture of Vimy Ridge. Both operations were to be launched on Easter Monday, 9 April. Nivelle's main attack went in on 16 April.

Vimy Ridge and the Plan

Running across the western edge of the Douai plain and rising to a maximum height of some 350 feet above it, Vimy Ridge protected the important industrial area around Lille held by the Germans and dominated the Lens-Bethune coal-producing area. The highest summit, known as Hill 145, where the Canadian memorial stands today, was at the northern end. A more southerly height was called Hill 135. From the latter the ridge broadened and sloped gradually to the south-west and south, with only a few villages and copses to break the monotony of its surface, until it reached the upper reaches of the Scarpe river. Its eastern slope, steep and wooded, dropped sharply to the Douai plain, in one place over 200 feet in 750 yards. To the north Hill 120 ("the Pimple") overlooked the smaller Souchez river, beyond which the high ground continued to the north-west as the Lorette ridge.

Late in 1914 the French had tried and failed to drive the enemy from Vimy Ridge. Attacks the following year gained some ground on the forward slope but this was lost in 1916.



Historical Section, G.S.

When the Canadian Corps took over the sector during October the German forward defences were found to consist of three lines of trench, protected by deep belts of barbed wire and interspersed with elaborate redoubts and concrete machine-gun emplacements; the major part of the garrison was housed in deep dugouts, tunnels and caves burrowed into the chalk. The second position on the reverse slope was a mile to the rear on the north-west and two miles on the south-east. Running diagonally between these two, from the village of Vimy southwards, was an intermediate line of trenches. Supporting artillery was disposed chiefly along the upper edge of the woods which covered the escarpment or along the open ground at its foot, sheltered by the Arras-Lens railway embankment. During the winter a third system of trenches, running through Oppy and Méricourt, was begun. The German Sixth Army had been slow to alter its forward dispositions, however, and most of the defended localities about Vimy Ridge were still in the front rather than the rear of the battle zone as March came to an end; moreover, the reserve divisions were held too far back to counter-attack promptly.

The Canadian Corps was commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng (afterwards Field-Marshal Viscount Byng of Vimy). His preparations were based on a First Army plan of operations dated 31 January; subsequent changes were in detail only. Capture of the main crest, and particularly Hill 135 and the village of Thélus, was the objective of a first (Southern) operation; if this was successful, the Pimple and the Bois en Hache were to be assaulted 24 hours later as a separate (Northern) operation.

Attacking on a 7000-yard front stretching from Ecurie to west of Givenchy, the four Canadian divisions (in numerical order from right to left) were to carry out the first and main operation, with the British 5th Division as corps reserve. The tasks of the Canadian divisions differed in scope due to the fact that, while their trenches ran north and south and their advance was to be eastward, the Ridge ran from south-east to north-west. The Canadian right would have to cover 4000 yards to its final objective, but an advance of 700 yards would place the 4th Canadian Division on the summit of Hill 145. Divisions were to attack on two-brigade frontages, and capture of the first objective would carry the whole across the three enemy forward trenches for an average gain of 700 yards. This should give the 4th Canadian Division possession of Hill 145. The extent of the advance and the capture of each objective were to be reported back by patrolling aircraft. After a pause of 40 minutes for

consolidation the attack was to be resumed. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were to carry out a further advance of 400 yards; the 3rd would press on slightly to reach the far edge of the Ridge and units of the 4th, advancing down the reverse slope of Hill 145, were to seize the German reserve trenches there. By zero plus 95 minutes these latter divisions should have secured their final objective.

The 1st and 2nd Divisions would then employ their reserve brigades against the remaining objectives. The latter's sector being wider, the British 13th Infantry Brigade would be introduced on the left. This third phase would clear the enemy out of the last segment of his intermediate line, secure the village of Thélus and breach the second-line trenches in this sector. Final attack would secure the remainder of these and give the Canadians possession of the eastern escarpment. While patrols moved forward as far as the Arras-Lens railway embankment the final position all along the corps frontage would be consolidated against counter-attack by a line of posts among the woods on the eastern slope; machine-gunners were to be taken along for that specific purpose. Subsequently a main line of resistance would be constructed 100 yards behind the crest (on what would then be the reverse slope) while additional machine-gun posts were built a further 100 yards to the rear. The later Northern operation would be carried out by the left (4th) Canadian Division and the 24th (right) Division of the adjacent British 1st Corps.

Preparations for the Attack

No particular secret was made of the plan, except as regards the day and hour of attack, and the Canadians were given an unprecedented opportunity to learn their roles. Thoroughness was the keynote of the preparations. In the rear area the German defences were reproduced in full-scale detail from aerial photographs, with tapes to mark trenches and flags to mark strongpoints, and repeated rehearsals were held. All ranks were well acquainted with the sector on their own side of No Man's Land. Great numbers of detailed maps were provided. Meanwhile the Engineers were extending the roads and light railways so that the necessary stores and ammunition could be moved forward. Complementary increases in telephone and telegraph facilities, water supply and other services were undertaken. Even though this activity was carried on in full view of the enemy, little effort was made to disrupt the preparations.

It was planned to destroy the enemy's defences by a two-week bombardment. With the aid of aerial photographs all essential targets were carefully tabulated and arrangements

made to take immediate action upon the correlation of information subsequently obtained from aircraft, balloons, sound rangers, flash spotters and ground observers. It was emphasized that success would depend largely upon close co-operation between artillery and machine-guns and between the Intelligence sections of First Army and Canadian Corps Headquarters. Observed fire would be laid down daily on trenches, dug-outs, concrete machine-gun emplacements and other strongpoints, entrances to tunnels, road-junctions, ammunition dumps and light railways to a depth of 4000–5000 yards behind the German front line; it was realized, however, that apart from the foremost lines of defence the total destruction of barbed wire entanglements would be out of the question. By night attention would be switched to the enemy's communications which would be harassed by incessant shell and machine-gun fire. Unprecedented importance was attached to counter-battery work, the ruling principle being that isolated batteries should be dealt with first, since those that were closely grouped could be more easily and economically neutralized later by high explosive and gas shells. These tasks were to be carried out by 245 pieces of heavy artillery and 618 field guns and howitzers placed at the disposal of the Canadian Corps, assisted by 280 more guns of the flanking British 1st Corps. The resulting density was one heavy gun for every 20 yards of frontage and one field gun for every 10 yards, a considerable increase over the firepower available for the earlier Somme offensive. The Canadian Machine Gun Companies' 280 guns were allotted harassing fire tasks, and trench mortars were to join in the destruction of the foremost German trenches.

The first phase of the bombardment began on 20 March, but only about half the batteries participated in order to conceal as long as possible the great concentration of artillery on such a narrow front. The guns of the Third Army joined in on 2 April for the second and more intensive phase which the Germans called "the week of suffering." Special attention was given to the villages of Thélus, Les Tilleuls and Farbus and the German support troops resting there were driven into the open fields with a consequent loss in sleep and efficiency. Numbers of Germans in the forward trenches went without food for two or three days and were further exhausted by the endless task of trying to keep open the entrances to their deep dugouts. The persistently bad weather impeded the flow of ammunition required to replenish our forward dumps but increased the effect of the shelling, causing the enemy's forward defence system to lose its continuity in places.

Nightly raids were conducted during the bombardment, varying in size from a few individuals to the 600 all ranks sent out by the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade on 31 March. It was learned that the Ridge was defended by five regiments; four of these had been in the line for at least five weeks and many of the rifle companies were greatly reduced in strength. The first and second trenches were manned by a forward battalion of each regiment, a second battalion was either in the third trench or immediately to the rear as close support, while the third battalions were resting in villages five or six miles back and could not reach the battlefield in less than two hours. Thus there would be approximately 5,000 troops to oppose the initial attacks by 15,000 Canadians and a reinforcement of 3,000 to meet the 12,000 Canadian and British troops available to support the first attacks or press forward to the subsequent objectives. The only further German reserves were two divisions 12 to 15 miles distant near Douai.

Haig points out in his dispatch that the artillery preparation depended largely upon air reconnaissance. Accordingly, "a period of very heavy air fighting ensued, culminating in the days immediately preceding the attack in a struggle of the utmost intensity for local supremacy in the air." Bad flying weather and superior German aircraft and equipment resulted in the Royal Flying Corps suffering considerable losses; but thanks to its good work some 86 per cent of the enemy's 212 active batteries were located. Starting with the night of 5 April limited bombing was carried out aginst German airfields and railway installations and, although the weather was far from ideal, these operations were continued on each succeeding night.

The Attack, 9 April

Easter Sunday found the Canadian Corps augmented to a strength of approximately 170,000 all ranks, of whom 97,184 were Canadians; apart from the British 5th Division in corps reserve the non-Canadians were chiefly artillery, engineer and labour units attached for special tasks. That evening the infantry battalions began to move forward to their assembly areas, guided by luminous painted stakes and in many cases completing their journey through one of the elaborate subways constructed by the tunnellers beforehand. The enemy's forward wire had been cut and patrols now cut lanes through the Canadian wire so that forward companies could file through to occupy the shallow ditches in No Man's Land from which they would assault. By 4 a.m. the troops were in position, without alarming the German outposts a bare 100 yards away.

Not until 5:30 a.m. did the batteries

open fire. After three minutes of rapid fire on the German forward trench the field artillery barrage began to creep forward, lifting 100 yards every three minutes. Ahead of it a bullet-swept zone was created by 150 machine-guns. Simultaneously the heavy guns deluged the German battery positions and ammunition dumps with high explosive and gas shells, the latter killing horses and thus putting an end to the mobility of guns and wagons. Observation posts either had been destroyed or now were clouded by smoke and their telephone communications disrupted. Seldom has counter-battery work been so effective.

A driving wind from the north-west made the attacking infantry shiver as they followed the barrage closely across the cratered and soggy ground; but it blew the falling snow and sleet into the defenders' faces. Furthermore, coming after a comparatively quiet night the first hurricane of the bombardment had taken the enemy garrison by surprise and many failed to get out of their deep dugouts before Canadian infantrymen were at the entrances. There was some hand-to-hand fighting, but the assault was a rapid and unqualified success. Within thirty minutes the six assaulting battalions of the 1st Canadian Division had cleared all three trenches of the German forward defences. After the planned pause, during which the objective was consolidated under cover of a standing barrage, the rear companies continued the advance behind the creeping barrage to capture the intermediate line. The experience of the 2nd Canadian Division, advancing on a frontage of 1400 yards, was very similar; and from its second objective, reached according to timetable, Thélus and the rounded summit of Hill 135 could be seen through the snow and smoke. Enemy machine-gun posts had caused a considerable number of casualties, however. On the 3rd Division front so much destruction had been caused by the artillery that the enemy was unable to offer any serious resistance. By 7:34 a.m. the 7th and 8th Brigades had secured their second, and in this instance final, objective—roughly a mile of the crest of Vimy Ridge. As their patrols moved down the wooded eastern slope they were fired on by snipers, however, and casualties began to mount.

The 4th Canadian Division had the hardest fighting of the day. In its attack on Hill 145 the 11th (right) Brigade ran into a German strongpoint which had been repaired following an earlier bombardment. Machine-gun fire combined with uncut wire caused heavy losses here, and this affected the advance of the 12th (left) Brigade which at first had made good progress. It was not until repeated attacks had

been made and darkness was falling that the last of the enemy was driven from the summit.

Although it was assumed that the 1st and 2nd Divisions would meet less opposition assaulting their third and fourth objectives there was no absolute certainty that the Germans were "on the run:" it was considered necessary, therefore, to adhere to the artillery programme. Thus only at 8:35 a.m. did the reserve brigades move forward to the attack, with the British 13th Infantry Brigade on the left front of the 2nd Division's wider sector. By 11 a.m. the 1st Canadian Division's 1st Brigade was in possession of its third objective, 1100 yards distant, while the 6th Canadian and 13th British Brigades had passed through the German intermediate line to occupy respectively Thélus village and the fortified ground north of it. Moving forward again at midday they cleared the second system of trenches on the reverse slope of the Ridge, and passed through Farbus. By late afternoon patrols had penetrated to the railway embankment and the units were consolidating their gains in anticipation of counter-attack. As the neighbouring 51st Division of the 17th Corps did not achieve its final objective until the following morning a defensive right flank had to be extended back to the intermediate line.

Subsequent Operations, 10–14 April

Artillery reconnaissance aircraft directed harassing fire on German reserves moving forward across the Douai plain, with the result that effective counter-attacks never materialized. On 10 April the 10th (reserve) Brigade of the 4th Canadian Division assaulted the two German trenches remaining on the reverse slope of the Ridge, following close behind a creeping barrage and clearing both within thirty minutes, though not without heavy loss. The Canadian Corps now occupied the whole of its original objectives.

The necessity of employing the 10th Brigade in this last attack meant that a delay of 24 hours would be necessary before it could participate in the second (Northern) operation against the Pimple. Again assisted by a snowstorm and driving wind, two of its battalions launched this previously-rehearsed attack at 5 a.m. on 12 April, moving forward behind a barrage fired by 96 field guns. Here also the German first and second trenches had been almost obliterated by the earlier bombardment and only slight opposition was encountered from the badly dazed garrison. Meanwhile the 73rd Infantry Brigade of the British 24th Division captured the Bois en Hache to complete the operation.

Following the discovery that the Germans were making a general

withdrawal an advance was ordered along the whole Corps front on the afternoon of 13 April. The next morning, however, patrols came up against stiffened resistance along the forward defences of the German third line, running through Oppy and Méricourt. This was far enough from the Ridge to reduce the advantages of observation and was too strong to attack without intensive preparation by heavy guns which could not be moved forward until the almost obliterated roads had been rebuilt. Here the Canadian advance was stayed for the moment. The operation had cost the Corps over 11,000 casualties.

The first phase of the Battles of Arras was at an end. The Third British Army had had good success in front of Arras, though it had not got through the Hindenburg Line, and this combined with the Canadian advance at Vimy had resulted in the capture of more ground and more prisoners than any previous British offensive on the Western Front. Nivelle's offensive on the Chemin des Dames was a bloody failure and was followed by widespread disaffection in the French armies. The brunt of the rest of the year's campaign was to fall on the British, whose centre of activity moved northwards to Flanders.

Comments

On the "strategic" level the operations of April 1917 were unsatisfactory from the Allied viewpoint. As so often on the Western Front in this war, one sees the effect of lack of clear-cut *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*. Important local successes were gained without achieving any genuine effect upon the outcome of the war. The plans made for exploitation were ineffective, and the main operation to which those at Vimy and on the Scarpe were supposed to be subsidiary accomplished nothing.

On the lower "tactical" level, on the other hand, the Battle of Vimy Ridge presents a bright picture: a sound plan effectively carried out.

> With all arms and services it was the same —labour crowned with success. The Heavy Artillery destroyed the field defences, silenced the enemy's batteries and broke up his reserves; the Field Artillery fired a perfect barrage under which the infantry moved steadily forward in accordance with an exact time-table overcoming one centre of resistance after another and proceeding to one objective after another; and as each objective was reached it was consolidated and machine guns disposed to meet counter-attacks.
>
> The wounded were brought back and cared for; ammunition, rations, and forage were brought forward at the proper time and in the proper order; there was neither hurry, nor confusion, nor delay. To an unusual extent the course of this battle can be followed by the orders issued . . . *

The preparatory bombardment ruled out the possibility of achieving *Surprise* on the strategic level, but a useful degree of tactical surprise was obtained on 9 April. Much of the

*Col. A. F. Duguid, "*Canadians in Battle, 1915–1918*" (*Annual Report, *Canadian Historical Association, 1935*).

success obtained was due to effective *Co-operation* between the arms and services. The increased importance of the assistance of the air arm is a notable feature of the operation in this connection. Efficient detailed *Administration* was, as always, the forerunner of victory. Finally, the thorough preparations made and the pains taken to ensure that every individual fully understood his own task helped to produce and maintain the high *Morale* required to carry through successfully an operation so formidable as the breaching of the enemy's long-prepared defences on Vimy Ridge.

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THE BATTLE OF AMIENS

1918

The "Great War", 1914–19, was the first overseas conflict in which Canadian military forces played a major part. It is a most vital incident in the national history of Canada and, quite apart from its purely military importance, one with which every Canadian soldier certainly ought to be well acquainted.

The Canadian Army made its contribution almost entirely on the Western Front. The operations of 1915–18 there have been regarded, with reason, as generally uninspired and conveying only negative lessons to the strategist and the tactician. The battle here described, however, was conducted with greater skill and imagination than earlier ones and proved to be the beginning of a series of victories which led directly to the Armistice.

Background of the Battle

Following the Germans' failure to obtain a quick decision in 1914, trench warfare and stalemate developed. Both the British and French High Commands came to believe that prolonged artillery bombardment, if only heavy enough, could crush out all life in an area, leaving assaulting infantry merely the task of mopping up. Time and again it was tried, but invariably after the barrage passed the Germans emerged from their deep dugouts and mowed down the advancing infantrymen with machine-guns, firing in enfilade along barbed wire obstacles. In 1916 the British produced an answer to the lethal combination of automatic weapons, field defences and wire — the tank; but it was long before it was properly employed.

By 1918 both sides were beginning to feel a shortage of men.* The

* *Infantry shortages led the British Army to reorganize its brigades into three, instead of four, battalions, at the beginning of 1918. Furthermore, it was now necessary to employ low-category men in forward units, with a further decrease in operational efficiency. Although only three brigades of the five Australian divisions were so reorganized, this corps was experiencing periodic shortages of reinforcements. The Canadian Corps retained its original organization and thus was a more powerful striking force than any four-division British corps.*

United States had not yet been able to deploy its great resources; and Ludendorff utilized the temporary advantage afforded by the Russian collapse of 1917, which gave him 192 divisions against the Allies' 173. In March 1918 he attacked the weakest point of the Allied line. Initial German penetration was deep but was halted. It was not until July, however, that the Allies were able to regain the initiative. Ferdinand Foch had been appointed Allied Generalissimo during the critical March days, and now his governing idea was to strike successively at widely dispersed points, to free his own lateral communications and give the Germans no respite while his own resources were growing.

Foch had wanted Haig to attack in Flanders, but Haig convinced him that it was more desirable to eliminate the German salient east and southeast of Amiens, which interfered with the use of the town and its railway running back to Paris. Haig proposed a combined Franco-British operation under his own control, the main effort being made by General Rawlinson's Fourth Army which would attack north of the Luce River while the First French Army (Debeney) advanced on its right.

By 1918 the Germans had become accustomed to regard the arrival of either the Canadians or the Australians as a notice of impending attack. Four of the five Australian divisions were already on the Fourth Army front and it was planned to bring the 1st Australian Division back from Flanders to reinforce the coming attack. On 20 July Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, commanding the Canadian Corps, then under the First Army on the Arras front, was informed of the impending operation and told that his Corps was to take part. Although Currie visited Fourth Army Headquarters for planning conferences, his divisional commanders were kept in the dark until 31 July. To deceive the enemy two Canadian infantry battalions, two casualty clearing stations and the Corps wireless section were sent north to Flanders, where these Canadians made their presence known to the Germans opposite. Only on 30 July did the Canadian Corps begin its secret move to the Fourth Army sector, with officers and men completely unaware of where they were going or what they were to do. Pending their arrival a French corps was withdrawn southward and the Australian front extended. Since British units had not previously served in this area, there was the added problem of creating rear area installations, which placed one more burden upon the overworked railways and limited motor transport. By the night 3/4 August the Canadians had arrived in the Amiens area but vast quantities of ammunition still had to be brought to forward dumps for

the artillery. By the night of 6/7 August all was in readiness, however, and the troops could be informed of the pending operation.

To attract still more enemy attention to Flanders, the newly-organized Royal Air Force had been ordered to occupy additional airfields and to increase air activity there until 6 August. Above the British Fourth Army front abnormal air activity was avoided, although on the night preceding the attack Handley-Page bombers patrolled the front line to drown the noise of assembling British tanks. As an innovation, the officer commanding the R.A.F. formation had drawn up a memorandum, to be communicated to all pilots and observers on the afternoon prior to attack, setting forth the general outline of the plan of battle so that they would be better able to appreciate the operations and turn in more valuable reports. At that time total available British air strength consisted of 147 day bombers, 92 night bombers, 75 fighter reconnaissance aircraft, 376 fighters and 110 corps planes. Similarly the French had concentrated 1104 aircraft to support their First Army. The main German air strength was still in Champagne and there were only 365 aircraft of all types to oppose the Allies' 1904.

Some suspicion had been aroused on the German side but this was quelled by an order issued by Ludendorff only four days before the attack. This declared that there was nothing to justify apprehension. Evidently Ludendorff was sufficiently uneasy about the defeatism which was spreading among the common soldiers to misread any omen. Rumours of tank noises were described by higher staffs as "phantoms of the imagination or nervousness."

The Plan of the Offensive

The British plan was as follows. In order to pinch out the German salient and reach the old Amiens Defence Line, five to seven miles ahead of the existing front, attacks were to be made against three successive objectives — the forward German defences, the reserve localities and gun lines, and finally what were believed to be only scattered enemy strongpoints. As at Cambrai*, preliminary bombardment was dispensed with, in order to heighten surprise, but a lifting barrage was scheduled to move just ahead of the first wave of tanks. Two-thirds of the

* *On 20 November 1917 a force of 381 tanks, followed by a relatively small proportion of infantry, had rolled forward in the early morning light, without preliminary bombardment, and caught the Germans napping. Tactical surprise was restored to the Western Front, but by the time a five-mile penetration had been made the surviving tank-crews were exhausted and the infantry unable to progress further on their own: thus, with open countryside just beyond, decisive success was in sight when the momentum failed. German counter-attacks retrieved the situation, but the British had learned the lesson of proper tank employment.*

British guns were assigned to counter-battery tasks. At the same time the R.A.F. would attack German aerodromes to reduce enemy air activity and other aircraft were to give close support to the advancing troops; however, railway junctions were not to be attacked until evening as it was considered that 12 hours would elapse before enemy reserves, set in motion by the attack, would be within striking distance. On the eve of battle the British Fourth Army had a striking force of 13 divisions (plus three available in G.H.Q. reserve) and a cavalry corps of three divisions (also earmarked as G.H.Q. reserve), supported by 1386 field guns and howitzers and 684 heavy pieces, 342 heavy tanks, 72 whippets (light tanks) and 120 supply tanks.

The ground to be crossed, between the Avre and Somme rivers, was a rolling plateau well suited for the employment of tanks. In front of the French, on the extreme right, it was a "real billiard table" but, on the British front, it was scooped by hollow depressions leading towards the rivers. There were a few large villages, usually surrounded by orchards so that they resembled woods, which would also obstruct the advance. On the Canadian right the plateau was cut by the valley of the Luce, which, though a mere stream in August, presented obstacles in the form of swamp, pools and small belts of trees. On the extreme left the plateau was little more than a flat-topped ridge; however, spurs and re-entrants made it unsuitable for tank operations where it sloped towards the rivers.

The Canadian Corps was to attack on a three-division front of approximately 7000 yards, with the 4th Canadian Division in reserve. The most difficult task fell to the 3rd Division on the right; in addition to having to effect a crossing over the Luce in the beginning it had to maintain contact with the French who, unsupported by tanks, were not to move without a preliminary bombardment. The 3rd Division was to attack its first objective with two brigades; the reserve brigade would then take over for the second objective. The final phase on this front would be undertaken by the 4th Division brought forward from reserve. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions, centre and left, were each to attack with one brigade forward and merely leapfrog a fresh brigade forward for each succeeding phase. The Canadian Independent Force of two motor machine-gun brigades, a cyclist battalion and a section of medium trench mortars was to protect the right flank and maintain liaison with the French. British tank battalions were to lead the assault on each divisional sector and R.A.F. aircraft were detailed to work with the tanks.

The Australian Corps on the left was to assault in a similar manner, but with two of its four assaulting divisions advancing abreast on a front of roughly 7500 yards. The battle-worn 1st Australian Division was in reserve. On the extreme left the British 3rd Corps was given only the limited task of keeping abreast of the Australians, to be undertaken in two phases.

Although the proposal had been Haig's and the plan evolved mainly by Rawlinson, it was Foch who first proposed an enlargement of the original scheme. At an important conference held on 5 August he directed that, if the initial attack was successful, reserves should be pushed south-eastwards as far as possible. During this stage the Cavalry Corps would he held ready to pass through anywhere there was an opening. It may be noted that the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was serving with the 3rd Cavalry Division, which had been placed under the command of Canadian Corps until the breakthrough had been accomplished when it, and the cavalry brigade and whippet tanks placed at the disposal of the Australian Corps, were to revert to Cavalry Corps command.

The First Day's Fighting

A few minutes before zero hour, 4.20 a.m. on 8 August, 430 British tanks started from their assembly areas and at zero hour, behind a lifting barrage, they rumbled ahead, guided through a mist which hid them from the enemy by a leading wave of infantrymen. Behind them, in extended order, came the assault battalions, followed by the units of the reserve brigades in close formation. Very few casualties were suffered in the early stages as the enemy artillery was not effective and soon was silenced by counter-battery fire.

The advance was a departure from the methodical plodding of earlier battles and taking a leaf from the German infiltration tactics, introduced in the preceding March, troops and tanks pushed ahead regardless of what lay on their immediate flanks, by-passing strong opposition where it could not be pinched out by a flanking movement. In less than an hour and a half the Canadians had secured their first objective and, after a pause while field guns were brought forward and reserve brigades of infantry took over the assault role, the advance was resumed at a somewhat slower pace.

By ten o'clock in the morning the mist had cleared sufficiently for German machine-gun nests to bring down withering fire on the advancing troops. Mopping up such strong-points took time, even when tanks were available. There had been little real co-operation between infantry and tanks previously, but the errors

apparent at Cambrai had been corrected and, generally speaking, the infantry now followed closely enough behind the tanks to prevent the enemy reorganizing.

Towards 11 a.m. the Canadian Corps was on its second objective and, while the 4th Division and the still fresh reserve brigades of the 1st and 2nd Division were forming on the last start line, the 3rd Cavalry Division and a battalion of whippet tanks passed through to attack across what was now open country. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade got through the village of Beaucourt but the wood beyond was strongly held by infantry and guns and the troopers were unable to approach. On the whole the Cavalry's work did not come up to expectations; it had never before co-operated with light tanks, which were too slow to keep up with horsemen across open country but got ahead too quickly when machine-gun fire was encountered. There was no lack of gallantry but horses and men proved to be too easy targets for machine-gun bullets. Thus the hoped-for breakthrough of the Cavalry Corps never materialized.

Undismayed by the sight of many empty saddles coming back through their advancing waves, the infantry mopped up the remaining enemy posts and relieved the few hard-pressed squadrons who were on the final objective. Except on their right the Canadians had taken all their objectives and the Australian Corps had managed to do the same after considerable hard fighting. The French were about a mile behind on the extreme right while the British 3rd Corps had only been able to take the first of its two objectives.

The same mist which had aided the infantry and tanks to advance had kept the Air Force grounded until late forenoon. Once visibility was restored, however, aircraft began close support sorties, flying at tree-top level; German reserves were strafed and their forward movement harassed by bullets and bombs. Smoke screens were laid on both corps fronts and flares also were dropped by reconnaissance planes to guide infantry and tanks on to enemy strongpoints. Unfortunately, however, although 205 bombing flights were made and 12 tons of small (25-lb.) bombs were dropped, concerted efforts to destroy the Somme bridges and prevent fresh enemy divisions being rushed up proved unsuccessful. Owing to the inability to bomb enemy airfields earlier these could now be used for refuelling by the inferior force of German planes hurriedly transferred from neighbouring army fronts. For example, the notorious Richthofen Circus, now commanded by Hauptmann Hermann Goering, was able to remain in action almost continuously until re-



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duced from 50 to 11 aircraft. The R.A.F. lost 97 aircraft out of about 700 serviceable (day flying) planes in action and still was faced with the problem of destroying the bridges over the Somme.

Success had been sweeping and the penetration of six to eight miles had eliminated the enemy salient and with it more than 27,000 Germans, or almost the whole of the garrison of the sector—nearly 16,000 being prisoners. More than 440 guns and masses of material were captured, and all this was accomplished with the lightest casualties yet sustained in a major attack on the British front. More important, however, the morale of the German Supreme Command suffered a shock from which it did not recover. Ludendorff afterwards referred to 8 August as "the black day" of the German Army.

Later Phases of the Offensive

It should be remembered that London and Paris were busy planning a 1919 campaign when Foch and Haig launched this first of a series of attacks with limited objectives. In later life General Sir Arthur Currie wrote of Amiens as follows:

> The success of the Australians and Canadians on August 8th was so startling . . . that in my opinion GHQ had no definite ideas what to do.
>
> . . . senior staff officers hurried up from GHQ to see me and to ask what I thought should be done. They indicated quite plainly that the success had gone far beyond expectation and that no one seemed to know just what to do. I replied in the Canadian vernacular: "The going seems good: let's go on!"

It was not until just before midnight, however, that General Rawlinson told his three corps commanders to continue the advance next day. There seemed no reason then why the general line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray sur Somme-Dernancourt could not be reached, as the next organized enemy defence was the old Hindenburg position.

Before the first day's fighting had ended, however, the Germans had been able to bring up six fresh divisions, and every succeeding hour brought more support. The single Canadian objective (on the right) remaining from the previous day was captured on the 9th by a brigade of the 4th Canadian Division but, due to a series of frustrating delays, the main corps attack did not get under way until noon. In turn this held up the Australian advance on the left. Worst of all, only 145 British tanks were still serviceable. According to the official British account:

> The ground fighting during the day was of a very disjointed nature; the attacks of various divisions and brigades started at different times and under different conditions. Some of them were covered by artillery, some supported by tanks, whilst others were carried out by infantry unaided. The German defence was similarly very uneven and without any serious attempt at counter-attack. In the result only a bare three-miles advance, half the way to Roye-Chaulnes, was accomplished.

The R.A.F. continued its attempt to destroy the Somme bridges but without success.

Similar fighting took place on the two following days. By then the weary troops had reached the extensive German defences of the old Somme battlefield of two years previously. German reinforcements totalled 13 divisions, or a strength equal to the attackers', and they now had the advantage of fighting from behind well-organized defences while, as at Cambrai, the British Army had exhausted its local reserves. Very few tanks remained in action. With the approval of Sir Douglas Haig, the attack scheduled for 12 August was called off. It was intended to continue the general attack on 14 or 15 August and indeed General Foch still believed important success to be possible. It was obvious to the commanders on the spot, however, that further advance was impossible without incurring heavy casualties. General Currie now considered that there was no object in persevering. Haig insisted that the operation be wound up and Foch reluctantly agreed. Although less spectacular than those of the 8th, the advances of the three concluding days had increased the total penetration to as much as 12 miles. Fourth Army casualties for the four days of battle were only 22,202 (killed, wounded and missing),* of whom 9074 came from the Canadian Corps, while it is believed that the Germans lost more than 75,000. Later in the month Foch struck heavily at other points and thereafter the Germans were steadily rolled back. In the autumn their High Command sought an end to hostilities.

Comments

In later days the Germans tried to attribute their defeat at Amiens to a massed attack by tanks, but, as readers will have surmised, credit for the victory actually belongs primarily to the infantryman, though he got the best of support from artillery and armour and from the air.

The plan for the Battle of Amiens, incorporating the experience gained at Cambrai in 1917, represents the return to the Western Front of an imaginative conception of strategy and tactics very different from that which had ruled there so long. The battle plans based on mere weight of bombardment, which had gained so little ground at such heavy cost, were replaced by an intelligent attempt to profit by the potentialities of powerful new weapons employed in combination. Above all, the Amiens plan is remarkable for its exploitation of the principle of *Surprise*, that great old winner of battles, which had been so completely neglected by the planners of the Somme and Passchendaele. An effective de-

* *The French, however, suffered 24,232 casualties in their mere limited advance, designed mainly to keep abreast of the Canadians.*

ception scheme, in conjunction with the elimination of preliminary bombardment (the tanks, to some extent, replacing the artillery as support for the assaulting infantry), supplies the chief explanation for the victory.

The other Principles of War were not all so completely applied by the Allies in this battle. It is apparent that there was some lack of clarity in the matter of *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim;* the higher command had evidently not thought beyond the possibility of a local success, nor—as was natural in view of the whole Western Front background—had it provided for that degree of *Flexibility* which might possibly have permitted an exploitation that would have increased the victory. It was the Germans, indeed, whose operations showed most flexibility; in spite of the way they had been surprised, they reacted rapidly and reinforced their front in time to prevent a complete breakthrough.

Thanks once more to surprise, the Fourth Army was able to achieve effective *Concentration of Force*, massing strength superior to that of the Germans at the decisive time and place. The surprise attained likewise enhanced the effect of the blow dealt by the battle to German *Morale*, and its favourable effect upon the morale of our own forces—results which were powerfully felt throughout the later stages of the campaign.

In spite of the inadequate training of the cavalry for action with tanks, Amiens is an outstanding example of *Co-operation* — between infantry, tanks and artillery, and between the ground forces and the air. Finally, the victory rested—as usual—upon a foundation of effective *Administration*. The rapid, secret and orderly move of the Canadian Corps across the lines of communication of two Armies, and the speedy accumulation in the forward area of the huge stocks of ammunition and other material required, were vital preliminaries of a battle that marked the turning-point of the war.

The use of one new weapon of war—the aeroplane—deserves separate mention. The close support provided by the R.A.F. for troops on the ground, which has been described, was an important feature of the battle. Furthermore, as a result of the almost continuous air battles, the German Air Force suffered losses which it could not make good. The Allied air forces, however, were unable to prevent the Germans from bringing up sufficient reinforcements to halt the Allied advance. Could the battlefield have been isolated, the R.A.F. official historian observes, the victory might have been still greater than it was; but not until the later

stages of the Second World War were strategic and tactical air forces able to make a success of what came to be known as "interdiction."

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THE CONQUEST OF SICILY

1943

Early on the morning of 10 July 1943 troops of two Allied armies began landing at various beaches in the south-east corner of Sicily. The conquest of the island was successfully concluded 38 days later, when the last of the German garrison retired across the Messina Strait to the Italian mainland. This campaign, in which Canadian forces played a not inconsiderable part, marked the first major blow against the so-called "soft underbelly of the Axis", and provided the Allies with a springboard for operations against the mainland of Hitler's Europe.

The Sicilian operation is interesting to the soldier on several counts. The assault involved amphibious organization on a very large scale. The subsequent fighting meant, on one side, a difficult advance across mountainous terrain which gave great advantages to the defenders; on the other side, a delaying action maintained in the face of superior forces.

The Plan of Invasion

The decision to attack Sicily was taken at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. The Conference set the favourable July moon period as the target date for the invasion, to which was given the code-name "Husky". General Sir H. R. L. G. Alexander was named Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's supreme command, and was charged with the detailed planning, preparation and execution of the operation.

Planning began immediately under a special staff, but the fighting in Tunisia continued to occupy the attention of the Supreme Commander and his Deputy, as well as that of the two designated army commanders (General Sir Bernard Montgomery

and Lieutenant-General George S. Patton Jr.) until mid-May. The result was that the first outline plan, which called for separate assaults by the United States Seventh Army near Palermo in the north-west corner of the island, and the British Eighth Army near Catania on the east coast, did not meet with the full approval of those who would be responsible for carrying it out. The chief objection was to the wide dispersion of the proposed landings. Eventually the plan was completely recast "on the sound strategic principle of concentration of strength in the crucial area." The landings in the north-west were cancelled and the entire Western Task Force was diverted to the south-eastern assault, being placed on the Eighth Army's immediate left.

The plan as finally adopted fulfilled three main requirements: the landings were to take place on suitable beaches which could be given fighter cover from Allied airfields in Tunisia and on Malta; the major port of Catania would be an early objective (although administrative demands would be met initially by the use of lesser ports, and to an unprecedented extent, particularly in the American sector, by maintenance over the beaches); and the airfields in south-eastern Sicily would be seized in order to ensure protection for our ships lying off the beaches and to afford greater security for further offensive operations.

The assault area extended for more than 100 miles around Cape Passero, the extreme south-easterly tip of the island, to include the port of Syracuse on the right and the smaller harbour of Licata on the left. After preparatory operations by Allied naval forces and air forces to neutralize enemy naval efforts and gain air supremacy, the two task forces would launch pre-dawn seaborne assaults, assisted by airborne landings, designed to secure Syracuse and Licata and adjacent air bases and establish a firm lodgement area from which to conduct operations against the ports of Augusta and Catania and the important Gerbini group of airfields in the Catania Plain. The capture of these objectives would pave the way to the reduction of the island.

Allied estimates of the strength of the Axis garrison in Sicily proved substantially correct. Actually at the time of the invasion there were two German and four Italian field divisions and between five and six Italian coastal divisions on the island—the whole being under command of the Headquarters of the Italian Sixth Army, which was at Enna, the hub city of Sicily. The Italian forces, particularly those of the coastal formations, were of low fighting quality, considerably inferior to the

battle-seasoned troops of the two German divisions — the Hermann Göring Panzer Division and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. On the morning of 10 July the bulk of the Hermann Göring Division was at Caltagirone, midway between Augusta and Licata, where it formed, with two Italian field formations—the 4th (Livorno) and the 54th (Napoli) Divisions—a mobile reserve for counter-attack after the coastal divisions had met the first shock of invasion. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had been moved a few days earlier to the western end of Sicily in order to counter any assault on Palermo.

Against this garrison the Allies were to employ in the assault nine divisions (two of them airborne), an independent brigade and certain Commando units. To carry out the tasks assigned to the Eighth Army, General Montgomery planned five simultaneous landings, using the 13th Corps (the 5th and 50th Divisions) on his right; and the 30th Corps (the 1st Canadian and 51st (Highland) Divisions and the 231st (Malta) Brigade) on the left, on both sides of the Pachino peninsula. The main assault in the north was to be preceded by the drop of an air-landing brigade group of the 1st Airborne Division west of Syracuse and a landing by Commando troops south of the port with the joint object of securing road communications and capturing coastal batteries guarding the harbour. On completion of the assault phase the 13th Corps was to advance north across the River Simeto and capture Catania. On the Allied left General Patton would assault with the U.S. 2nd Corps (the 1st and 45th Divisions) in the Gulf of Gela to take the town of Gela and the Comiso group of airfields, and land the 3rd Division (reinforced by part of the 2nd Armoured Division) farther west to capture the port of Licata and its airfields. Once the lodgement area was secured, the Seventh Army's role was to protect the Eighth Army's left flank.

As D Day approached, a carefully co-ordinated convoy programme brought the invasion forces from many points of the compass to the assembly area south of Malta. British formations of the Eighth Army came from the Middle East and Tripolitania; the 1st Canadian Division sailed directly from the United Kingdom. The American assault divisions embarked at ports in Algeria and Tunisia. By the evening of 9 July more than 3000 merchant ships and naval craft were assembled in readiness for the descent upon Sicily. The Allied air forces had done their work well; seven weeks of heavy blows against Sicilian airfields had left many of them unserviceable and driven half the enemy's aircraft to bases on the Italian mainland.



Historical Section, G.S.

The Assault, 10 July 1943

As dusk fell the glider-borne 1st Airlanding Brigade (of the British 1st Airborne Division) and American paratroops of the 82nd Airborne Division—in all 5000 strong—took off from Tunisian airfields for Sicily. Their mission was only partly successful, both formations being widely dispersed. By late evening a gale which had threatened to postpone the seaborne assault moderated, and the first landings were made covered by naval bombardment shortly after midnight. They achieved success in all sectors. Caught completely by surprise, the Italian coastal defences offered little organized resistance, and by the end of D Day the Allies had captured all their initial objectives.

Major-General G. G. Simonds' 1st Canadian Division made its assault with the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades on a five-mile stretch of coast just west of the tip of the Pachino Peninsula, while farther west a Special Service Brigade of two Royal Marine Commandos, also under General Simonds, carried out simultaneous landings on the extreme left of the Eighth Army's front. Meeting only very slight resistance the 1st Brigade seized in rapid succession an Italian coastal battery and the deserted Pachino airfield, while on the left the 2nd Brigade linked up with the Commando forces and exploited three or four miles inland. Canadian casualties in the first 24 hours of the invasion were almost negligible.

Neither Army had yet encountered any Germans. On the east coast the 13th Corps, which was commanded by Lieutenant-General Miles C. Dempsey, had made rapid progress during the morning, and by 9:00 p.m. the 5th Division had reached Syracuse—to take the port undamaged. On the right of the Canadians the other formations of Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese's 30th Corps—the 51st Division and the Malta Brigade—had secured Pachino and the eastern half of the peninsula. The assault divisions of the U.S. Seventh Army, having landed in generally rougher surf conditions on the more exposed western beaches, had warded off scattered Axis bombing and strafing attacks, and by nightfall were holding firm bridgeheads about Licata and Gela.

Securing the Bridgehead

The next three days saw the establishment of the lodgement area envisaged in General Alexander's final invasion plan. On 11 July the 13th Corps gave its bridgehead over to the 30th Corps, and advanced northward on Augusta, which the 5th Division captured early on the 13th. The 30th Corps moved on two axes into the rough table-land which reaches down from Caltagirone to cover most of the south-east corner

of the island. The 51st Division reached Vizzini on the 13th. Advancing on the Corps' left the Canadians found resistance in the towns near the coast completely broken by Allied aerial bombing and naval shelling. By the morning of the 12th they had made contact with the 45th U.S. Division in Ragusa.

Meanwhile, on the Allied left General Patton's forces had gained possession of a continuous bridgehead which extended to a point 20 miles west of Licata. They were putting into use the captured airfields near the coast and preparing to deepen their holdings sufficiently to provide the necessary protection for the Eighth Army's left flank. The Americans had been the first to clash with the Germans. On 11 July their 1st Division had beaten back with the support of naval gunfire three fierce counter-attacks delivered in the Gela area by a battle group of the Hermann Göring Division using 60 tanks.

It was General Alexander's intention that after the assaulting armies had secured a firm base "on a line from Catania to Licata" his forces should proceed "to split the island in half." The first step in this direction would be to seize the central group of road junctions about Enna, and thence press on to the north coast in order to sever the east-west communications completely. Control of the road centres was of great tactical importance, for in the rugged terrain that covered the greater part of the island manoeuvre off the roads and tracks was extremely difficult, if not impossible. The unexpectedly light resistance encountered during the first few days of the campaign enabled General Montgomery to make a start on this plan before Catania had been captured. On 12 July he directed Leese to advance on Caltagirone and Enna, and thence on Leonforte, an important road centre on the main Catania-Palermo highway; the 13th Corps was to continue its drive northward along the coast.

The attack on the Army's right flank met strong opposition. On the night of 13-14 July Commando troops, landing in the Gulf of Catania, secured a road bridge on the main Syracuse-Catania highway; while farther north the 1st Parachute Brigade (of the 1st Airborne Division), dropping at the mouth of the Simeto River, captured the important Primosole Bridge six miles south of Catania. Both bridges were held until the arrival of relieving troops, and on the 16th, after very bitter fighting, a small foothold was established north of the Simeto. Efforts by the 50th Division to break out of this bridgehead failed; it was apparent that the Germans were determined to oppose as long as possible the capture of Catania and the important Gerbini airfields.

The Canadian Advance into the Hills

Late on the 15th, when already there were indications of a deadlock at the Simeto, the Army Commander wrote to General Leese urging him in view of the slowdown in operations on the right to "swing hard with our left" and push the Canadians on with all speed to Caltagirone, Enna and Leonforte. The Canadian advance had been resumed after a 36-hour rest ordered by General Montgomery. On 15 July the 1st Canadian Brigade passed through the 51st Division at Vizzini to lead the attack on the Corps' left flank. The Canadian axis of advance was the Syracuse-Vizzini-Enna highway, a section of which through Caltagirone lay within the area of the Seventh Army's bridgehead. The inter-army boundary was adjusted to give General Montgomery the exclusive use of the road, and the American axis of advance was turned sharply westward.

From Vizzini the paved highway ran north-westward over the plateau, climbing beyond Caltagirone into the irregular chain of hills which strikes down through the centre of Sicily from the main mountain barrier in the north. From the earliest days of Sicily's turbulent history the population have been forced to establish their inland communities on easily defended sites, usually on commanding heights. The main roads generally ascended to each of these lofty hill towns, and the Canadians were thus faced with the task of ousting the German defenders from a series of positions of great natural strength.

The enemy fully realized the importance of delaying as long as possible the Canadian advance through the hills. Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring, who as Commander-in-Chief of all German air and ground forces in Italy was directing the Axis operations in Sicily, was faced with the immediate problems of preventing the Allies from reaching Catania and pushing beyond to the Messina Strait in order to cut off the escape route to the mainland, while at the same time holding open his communications in central Sicily so as to allow the evacuation of his troops from the west. He decided to use the Catania-Etna area as a pivot for a withdrawal into the north-east corner of the island. By his orders the bulk of the Hermann Göring Division fell back to the north bank of the Dittaino River, a major tributary of the Simeto crossing the Catania Plain south of the Gerbini airfields. To protect the Hermann Görings' open right flank and preserve a route for the passage of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division from the west became the important tasks of the German rearguards along the axis of the Canadian advance.

The first encounter of Canadian

forces with the Germans took place on 15 July ten miles beyond Vizzini, when a mobile infantry and armoured column of the 1st Brigade was surprised by Hermann Göring detachments of artillery and tanks lying in wait in a hilltop town. After a three-hour skirmish the enemy retired, having inflicted 25 casualties and achieved his purpose of halting a much superior force. From this time the Canadians met increasingly stubborn opposition, both in the skilful delaying actions fought by the enemy rearguards from strong positions of their own choosing and the ingenious demolitions carried out by the German engineers along the narrow and tortuous mountain roads. It was to take the 1st Division a full week to reach and capture Leonforte, 70 miles by winding road from Vizzini.

Early on the 16th General Simonds sent forward from Caltagirone (which had been taken unopposed after destructive Allied air raids) the three battalions of the 2nd Brigade in troop-carrying vehicles, supported by a regiment of the 1st Army Tank Brigade and two regiments of field artillery (one self-propelled). In a defile three miles south of Piazza Armerina the leading battalion and its accompanying squadron of tanks came under heavy machine-gun and anti-tank fire from the surrounding hills. The infantry, hampered by the failure of wireless communications, fought their way up the steep hillsides, driving the defenders (a battalion of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division) from the summits, but it was early morning of the 17th before Piazza Armerina was finally secured, and noon before the advance was resumed.

For his next stand the enemy chose a highly defensible road junction narrowly enclosed between high hills eight miles north of Piazza Armerina. Here a side road branched off from the main Enna highway towards Valguarnera, a hilltop town overlooking the Dittaino valley and the western Catania Plain. As soon as the presence of the Germans in the pass was established, General Simonds ordered an attack in force on a two-brigade front, the 3rd Brigade, which was now in the lead, to seize the road junction and press on towards Enna, and the 1st Brigade to strike through the hills on the right and capture Valguarnera. The Germans repulsed with heavy mortar fire an attack up the main road by moonlight, but were driven from their posts on the afternoon of the 18th by a flanking thrust on the right supported by fire from four artillery regiments. In the meantime two battalions of the 1st Brigade had by dawn on the 18th made their way independently across a tangle of ravines and hills to the edge of a ridge overlooking the steep approaches to Valguarnera. Companies had become

separated in the uncompromising terrain, and the breakdown of communications prevented any artillery support. In such circumstances there was no co-ordinated effort by the two battalions against the town, and heroic attempts on a one- or two-company scale were repulsed by counter-attack and by effective fire from the commanding German positions. It was late in the day when the enemy began to withdraw from Valguarnera as the remaining battalion came forward with artillery support to complete the brigade task. The 24 hours' fighting, the heaviest yet experienced by the Division, had been costly to both sides.

The occupation of Enna was left to the U.S. 2nd Corps, and early on the 19th the 2nd Canadian Brigade moved northward from Valguarnera towards Leonforte. During the day General Simonds announced new objectives for the Division, arising from a decision of the Army Commander to abandon temporarily the thrust by the 50th Division against Catania because of strong enemy resistance near the coast, and instead to increase the pressure farther west. General Montgomery ordered the 5th and 51st Divisions on the inner flanks of the two Corps to attack in the centre towards the northern edge of the Plain, and the Canadians to turn eastward from Leonforte and drive towards Adrano, on the south-western skirts of Mount Etna. General Patton, whose forces were meeting only very light resistance as they overran western Sicily, was directed by General Alexander to develop a two-pronged threat eastward along the northern coast and the interior road through Nicosia.

General Simonds now widened his front to two brigades in order to make simultaneous attacks on Leonforte and Assoro, two miles to the east, and cut the highway east of Leonforte. At the same time he directed the 231st Brigade, which had come under his command on the right flank, to advance northward across the Dittaino valley in a threat against Agira, which was to become the target of a full divisional attack.

Assoro, perched near the top of a 2900-foot hill, was taken in a surprise assault by a battalion of the 1st Brigade after a hazardous cross-country march by night, which culminated in a daring ascent of the precipitous face of the mountain. The 2nd Brigade's attack on Leonforte was made frontally, but here again our tactics caught the Germans by surprise. The enemy's destruction of the bridge carrying the main road across a deep ravine south of the town seemed to have given him immunity from attack by our armour. Late on the 21st infantry companies, under cover of a heavy bombardment, fought their way into Leonforte on

foot while engineers began bridging the 50-foot gap. A fierce struggle developed in the streets, and the Canadians were cut off from outside support; but thanks to the strenuous and heroic efforts of the engineers under fire the bridge was completed during the night, and at daylight a "flying column" of infantry with tanks and anti-tank guns burst into the town. There was more bitter street-fighting, but by mid-afternoon Leonforte was clear. The enemy's determined efforts to hold the Leonforte-Assoro ridge marked a change from his earlier rearguard tactics of "delay and withdraw". From now on the Canadian advance was to be stubbornly opposed by strong forces charged with prolonged resistance at all costs.

The Eighth Army's Change of Plan

The German garrison in Sicily had been reinforced in the first few days of the invasion by two regiments of the 1st Parachute Division. On 16 July the Headquarters of the 14th Panzer Corps arrived to assume command, and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division began moving over from the mainland. The Corps Commander, General Hans Hube, with direct instructions from Hitler's headquarters "to fight a delaying action and gain further time for stabilizing the situation on the mainland," acted promptly and with skill. To secure his lifeline to Italy he organized the defences of the Messina Strait, placing a highly capable officer in full charge. To meet the American threat to his right flank (for by 22 July the Seventh Army had captured Palermo and was beginning to push eastward along the northern coast) Hube placed the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division between the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the north coast, thereby establishing a continuous defence line across north-east Sicily from Catania to San Stefano.

On 21 July General Montgomery, deciding that Catania could not be taken by frontal attack without incurring heavy casualties, directed all formations of the Eighth Army except the 1st Canadian Division to pass to the defensive along the line of the Dittaino River. The Canadians would carry the Army attack pending the arrival of the 78th Division, which he had ordered over from Tunisia to reinforce the 30th Corps for a drive through Adrano around the west side of Mount Etna.

The Drive Eastward

On the afternoon of 24 July the 1st Canadian Division attacked towards Agira (eight miles east of Assoro), supported by fighter bombers and artillery concentrations from five field and two medium regiments. From a rocky ridge a mile east of the intervening village of Nissoria, troops

of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division threw back with heavy losses successive assaults by each of the 1st Brigade's three battalions. Late on the 26th a barrage from 80 guns crushed the enemy's resistance as the 2nd Brigade took over the attack. The position was quickly overrun and a battalion broke through to fight its way on to a second ridge a mile to the east. Up to this point the nature of the country, which prevented the attackers from deploying on a large scale, had meant that a German force of not much more than one battalion had been successively engaged by five Canadian battalions, one at a time; circumstances had enabled the enemy to give a practical demonstration of the principle of economy of effort. On the night of the 27th, however, the 2nd Brigade put in a two-battalion attack, which drove the enemy from three heights overlooking Agira. The German garrison, whose line of retreat was threatened by the 231st Brigade, withdrew towards Regalbuto. The five-day battle for Agira was the largest and costliest in which the 1st Division was involved in Sicily.

Regalbuto, nine miles to the east, and the lofty hill town of Centuripe were the main outposts in front of the key position of Adrano. Regalbuto was captured on 3 August after the 231st Brigade and the 1st Canadian Brigade had gained control of the surrounding hills in four days of bitter fighting. On the same day the Centuripe stronghold fell to a full-scale assault by a brigade of the 78th Division. The newly arrived division had been committed at the Dittaino on 30 July, advancing from a bridgehead established by the 3rd Canadian Brigade. The 3rd Brigade had then pushed forward on the 78th Division's left flank to clear the enemy from the hills between Centuripe and Regalbuto.

From Centuripe the 78th Division took over the axis of the main highway to Adrano, and the 1st Canadian Division swung north across the Salso River. The task of clearing enemy-held heights towering more than 1000 feet above the river flats involved fighting on foot over rough trackless terrain, with mules carrying wireless sets and supporting weapons and ammunition. On the morning of 5 August General Simonds sent forward a tank-infantry force with mobile artillery which, paralleling a successful attack on the right by the 78th Division, in a brilliantly-executed operation cleared the north bank of the Salso to its junction with the Simeto.

The German Retreat from Sicily

The Canadian Division's active participation in the Sicilian campaign ended with a bloodless crossing of the Simeto River by the 3rd Brigade on the

night 5-6 August. Only pursuit operations remained, for after the loss of Regalbuto and Centuripe the enemy had begun falling back from the Catania Plain; on the 5th and 6th he gave up all the towns south of Mount Etna from Catania to Adrano. In the American sector Troina fell to the 1st U.S. Division on 6 August after a bitterly contested five-day battle, but on the northern coast the 3rd Division was held up by determined resistance west of Sant'Agata.

The final ten days of the campaign revealed General Hube's mastery in the retreat. On 26 July Hitler had authorized a withdrawal from Sicily; the evacuation began on 10 August. By sharp rearguard actions and extensive demolitions in the rugged terrain of the Messina peninsula Hube was able to hold Allied progress to his own time-table of withdrawal. Although he had very little air support and no naval support, he maintained effective control of the Messina Strait with his artillery, including a heavy concentration of anti-aircraft guns. Thinning out his forces on a succession of shortening lines of resistance, he succeeded in evacuating to the mainland the entire surviving German garrison and a large quantity of equipment.

During the last week of operations the 30th Corps took over control of the narrowing Eighth Army front. On 15 August the 78th and 51st Divisions completed the encirclement of Mount Etna, and on the same day the 50th Division on the coast reached within 30 miles of Messina. Meanwhile the American advance along the north coast had been accelerated by two amphibious landings, and on the morning of 17 August infantry of the 3rd United States Division entered Messina, followed shortly by British Commando troops, who had landed ten miles down the strait two nights before.

Comments

The conquest of Sicily was achieved by a well planned and executed assault on an unprecedented scale against a defended coast, followed by an arduous advance over extremely difficult country. The experience gained in the technique of amphibious warfare, although not as extensive as would have been produced by more strongly opposed landings, was to be of great value to the Allied forces in mounting subsequent operations of a like nature. The fighting inland was a foretaste of the hard campaign in Italy, in which a determined enemy skilled in defensive tactics made the best use of rugged and mountainous country to retard the Allied advance. The German operations in Sicily afford an excellent example of skilful delaying action. The Allied troops had the advantage of numbers and of excellent and powerful air and artil-

lery support; yet the victory was won mainly by the resolution and endurance of the infantry. So far as the Canadian Division was concerned, the course of the operations gave it a harder task than had been assigned to it in the original plan. That it did so well in its first campaign is evidence of the soundness of its training.

As in all amphibious operations, *Co-operation* was of vital importance here. The naval forces covered the landings, put the army ashore and maintained it afterwards; the air forces prepared the way for the invasion and gave constant assistance in the struggle across the island; the infantry relied with confidence on the support of the tanks, the artillery, the engineers and the services. The powerful influence of *Surprise* contributed to the easy success of the Allied assault; on the other hand, the rapid German reaction to the unexpected blow is an effective example of *Flexibility*, which appears also in the subsequent alteration of the Allied campaign plan to meet the new situation, and in the use of improvised seaborne landings to shake loose the Germans and hasten the advance. Efficient detailed *Administration*, as usual, lay at the root of the Allied victory. In this connection, the extensive maintenance over beaches, carried out in this operation with notable success, had considerable influence on the planning of the later assault in Normandy.

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THE NORMANDY ASSAULT 1944

The Normandy landings of June 1944 were one of the most decisive operations of the Second World War and, indeed, one of the most significant in modern military history. The invasion of North-West Europe marked the beginning of the final phase of the war with Germany and led, less than a year later, to the final German collapse. Canadian forces played an important part in the operation, which was tremendously complicated and on a vast scale.

Development of the Plan

In the summer of 1940 British forces were expelled from the continent of Europe, and Britain and the Commonwealth were thrown back on the defensive. The entry of the United States into the war late in 1941 made it possible to accelerate planning for a return to the continent, and American strategists were anxious to invade North-West Europe at the earlist possible date. During 1942, however, neither trained divisions nor landing craft were available in sufficient numbers to launch such an operation successfully, even though hard-pressed Russia was urgently demanding a "Second Front" in the west. Instead, available forces were diverted to North Africa where victory was achieved in 1943.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 the decision was taken that the build-up of men and material for an assault upon North-West Europe should be resumed. Lt.-Gen. F. E. Morgan, a British officer, was appointed "Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)" in March, and under him an Anglo-American planning staff began work on a broad operational plan for the great invasion. The target date for the operation was 1 May 1944.

The first task facing the COSSAC planners was the selection of the area to be assaulted. Command of the sea enabled the Allies to strike almost anywhere, but short-range fighter aircraft based on England could maintain command of the air only over the enemy-held coastal sector between Flushing and Cherbourg. Study of the beaches on this coast soon narrowed the choice to two main areas: the Pas de Calais (Strait of Dover) and that from Caen to Cherbourg. Although direct

assault on the Cotentin peninsula would bring the Allies the valuable port of Cherbourg, this area lacked suitable airfields and might become a dead end since the enemy could hold the neck of the peninsula with relatively light forces. The Pas de Calais offered a sea crossing of only twenty miles, good beaches, a quick turn-around for shipping and optimum air support; here, however, the German defences were at their most formidable. This left only the Bay of the Seine, where defences were light and the beaches of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Its distance from the south of England would make air support less easy but the terrain, especially south-east of Caen, was suitable for airfield development. Therefore the Caen area was selected for the initial assault, the intention being to expand the foothold into a "lodgement area" to include Cherbourg and the Brittany ports.

It had long been believed that the immediate capture of a major port was essential to the success of an invasion operation; but the Dieppe raid had shown how difficult such capture was likely to be, and experience in the assault on Sicily had encouraged Allied planners to rely on the possibility of maintaining an invasion force over open beaches. In the English Channel, however, it is always necessary to count on the possibility of bad weather; and with this in view General Morgan reported that in the absence of a major port it would be necessary to improvise sheltered water somehow. He recommended that two artificial ports be made by sinking blockships. This was the origin of the famous "Mulberry" harbour.

The availability of landing craft would limit the size of the assaulting force, and General Morgan had been told that he must plan on the basis of an assault by three divisions. He aimed to land these on a front of roughly 35 miles from Caen to Grandcamp, with three tank brigades and an extra infantry brigade following on the same day. A similar shortage of transport aircraft determined that only two-thirds of an airborne division* could be dropped; its main object was to be the capture of Caen. Assuming the best possible weather conditions the fifth day after the assault would find nine Allied divisions, with a proportion of armour, in the bridgehead. It was hoped that by D plus 14 about 18 divisions would have been landed, Cherbourg captured and the bridgehead expanded some sixty miles inland from Caen. On this basis General Morgan completed an outline plan during July 1943, and the

* *Although two had been made available.*

Combined Chiefs of Staff approved it at the Quebec Conference in August.

No Supreme Commander had yet been appointed; but in December 1943 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the American officer who had been commanding the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, was named to this post. His ground commander for the assault phase was to be the C.-in-C., 21st Army Group, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. Both these officers were convinced that under the COSSAC plan the initial assaulting forces were too weak and committed on too narrow a front. On his arrival in London the Supreme Commander approved changes suggested by General Montgomery; subsequently these were ratified by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To enable more landing craft to be available from production, the target date was put back to 31 May; subsequently a simultaneous landing which had been planned for the south coast of France was postponed until August. This made it possible to increase the initial assault force to five divisions supported by two follow-up divisions pre-loaded on landing craft.

The front to be assaulted was widened. On the west, it now included the beaches beyond the Vire estuary on the Cotentin peninsula, behind which it was planned to drop two American airborne divisions to speed the capture of Cherbourg; eastward it was extended somewhat to facilitate the seizure of Caen and the vital airfields in its vicinity. A British airborne division was to be dropped here to seize the crossing over the river Orne. The D Day objectives on the British flank included Caen and Bayeux; on the American side the plan was to penetrate to the vicinity of Carentan. Thereafter, as reported later by the Supreme Commander,

> . . . our forces were to advance on Brittany with the object of capturing the ports southward to Nantes. Our next main aim was to drive east on the line of the Loire in the general direction of Paris and north across the Seine, with the purpose of destroying as many as possible of the German forces in this area of the west.

The immediate purpose, however, and the one we are concerned with here, was the establishment of bridgeheads, connected into a continuous lodgement area, to accommodate follow-up troops. This initial assault phase was known by the code name "Neptune." The great liberation operation as a whole was called "Overlord." General Eisenhower's international headquarters, which absorbed the COSSAC organization, became known as SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force).

The Enemy Situation

Allied Intelligence had been able to provide a picture of German

dispositions in the west which proved, in the main, to be accurate. By 3 June enemy strength in the Low Countries and France had been increased to some 60 divisions. This included troops on the Biscay coast and the Riviera. All these formations were under the Commander-in-Chief West, Field-Marshal von Rundstedt. Army Group "B", commanded by Field-Marshal Rommel, included the Fifteenth Army, covering the Pas de Calais, where most German strategists believed invasion would come, and the somewhat smaller Seventh Army in Normandy and Brittany. The divisions holding the beach defences were not of high category and had limited transport. Thus German plans to defeat invasion in the north were chiefly built around seven panzer or panzer grenadier divisions which were held in reserve. The plans have usually been considered a compromise between the views of Rundstedt, who favoured defence in depth supported by strong mobile reserves and those of Rommel, who believed that the place to defeat invasion was on the beaches and therefore favoured placing the reserves close up to the coast.

Hitler's "Atlantic Wall," though he had ordered its construction in 1942, was still far from completion as 1944 opened. Attention had been directed mainly to the ports and the Pas de Calais. After Rommel took command of Army Group "B" early in the year the defences of other areas began to be reinforced with underwater obstacles, mines and more concrete; but in June much still remained to be done. The garrison of the assault area was also somewhat reinforced; in mid-March a good German field division appeared in the American sector. One coastal division manned almost the whole of the beaches allotted for British and Canadian assault; however, one panzer division was actually in the Caen area and two others were within a few hours' march.

The Final Preparations

Since the middle of 1943 the air assault by R.A.F. Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force against German war industry (particularly aircraft production) had been gaining momentum and, at the same time, decimating the enemy fighter force which tried to oppose this strategic bombing. About three months before D Day the air forces also began to strike at the French and Belgian railway systems to reduce enemy mobility all over North-West Europe. Somewhat later still attacks began on tunnels and

bridges* with the purpose of isolating the battlefield from the rest of France. Attacks upon enemy airfields within a radius of 130 miles from the assault area began by D minus 21, to force the removal of German fighters to more distant bases. In order to delude the enemy, however, only a part of the bombing effort was expended against the intended assault area; the Pas de Calais and other possible landing areas continued to receive attention.

These preliminary air operations had a vital effect upon the great Allied enterprise. To them must be attributed the almost total failure of the German air force either to attack the great pre-invasion concentrations of men and material in Southern England or to offer opposition to the actual assault. "Our D Day experience," General Eisenhower wrote later in his report, "was to convince us that the carefully laid plans of the German Command to oppose 'Overlord' with an efficient air force in great strength were completely frustrated by the strategic bombing operations. Without the overwhelming mastery of the air which we attained by that time our assault against the Continent would have been a most hazardous, if not impossible undertaking."

It was essential to mislead the Germans as to the time and place of the Allied attack. Elaborate security precautions, including the prohibition of travel out of Britain and even the denial to ambassadors of the use of uncensored diplomatic bags, were taken to prevent information reaching the enemy; and a cover plan was adopted to encourage him to think that we were going to attack the Pas de Calais. As part of this, Canadian formations were moved into the Dover area. Arrangements were made for naval and air diversions in the Channel to give the same impression.

The administrative preparations required were enormous. It was planned to land more than 175,000 men and more than 20,000 vehicles and guns in the first two days; and the requirements of the invading force in ammunition, food and supplies of every sort would be great from the beginning and would increase steadily as more troops landed. Since every unit and every item had to have a place in some ship or craft, and such a place as would enable it to perform its assigned function on the other side, very detailed administrative orders were required. To protect the camps and the depots near the embarkation ports, special air precautions and a special deploy-

** The Seine bridges were particularly heavily hit. Those over the Loire were left alone until after D Day. As the Seine bridges would have been equally important had we landed in the Pas de Calais, these attacks did not give the plan away.*

ment of anti-aircraft guns were necessary; however, as we have mentioned, the anticipated enemy air attacks did not come.

The Plan of Assault

The greatest lesson drawn from the Dieppe raid of 1942 had been the necessity of overwhelming fire support for any opposed landing on a fortified coast; and the 3rd Canadian Division, in a series of exercises with the Royal Navy, had helped to work out a "combined fire plan" suitable for the task. As used on D Day, the plan was as follows. During the night before the assault, the R.A.F. Bomber Command attacked the ten main coastal batteries that could fire on our ships. Immediately before the landings, the U.S. Eighth Air Force attacked the beach defences. In each case, over 1000 aircraft were used. Then the Allied Expeditionary Air Force "swarmed in to attack individual targets." Naval gunfire began at dawn, the bombarding force including five battleships, two monitors, 19 cruisers and numerous destroyers; naval rockets increased the storm just before the first troops touched down, and small craft gave close gunfire support. In addition, the Army made its own contribution; its self-propelled guns fired on enemy strongpoints from their tank landing craft.

Many special devices, and particularly special armoured vehicles, had been developed to assist the assault. Notable among them were the AVREs (Assault Vehicles, Royal Engineers)—tanks mounting "petards" for hurling heavy demolition charges—and the "D.D." or amphibious tanks, capable of swimming in from landing craft offshore. These two types of vehicles were to lead the assault, landing before the first infantry. A night landing had been discussed, but the Navy considered daylight essential to enable it to land the troops at the correct points and to increase the accuracy of the bombardment. The landing was therefore planned for soon after dawn. It was necessary that it should take place at a period of relatively low but rising tide, so that the beach obstacles would be exposed and the landing craft would not become stranded; and for the airborne operations during the night before the assault moonlight was desirable. The necessary combination of conditions would exist on 5 June and the two following days, and the 5th was accordingly designated D Day.

D Day:—The Assault

As 5 June approached everything seemed ready. The Allied Expeditionary Force had 37 divisions available—and others would move



Historical Section, G.S.

direct from the United States to France once ports had been captured. Under General Montgomery's Headquarters, the First U.S. Army was to assault on the right and the Second British Army on the left. The 5th U.S. Corps planned to use a regimental combat team of each of its two divisions on "OMAHA" Beach, while the 7th U.S. Corps attacked "UTAH" Beach with one division. In the British sector, the 30th Corps was on the right, with one division assaulting; on the left was the 1st Corps with two divisions. One of these was the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, on "JUNO" Beach; though the First Canadian Army had been designated a "follow-up" formation, Canada would be represented in the first landing by this division, supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. On its right was the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, on "GOLD" Beach, and on its left the 3rd British Division on "SWORD." British Commandos and American Rangers were given subsidiary objectives along the coast. The 6th British Airborne Division had the airborne task on the eastern flank and the 82nd and 101st U.S. Airborne Divisions those in the west.

Everything was ready—except the weather. On 4 June the meteorological report was so discouraging that General Eisenhower decided to postpone the operation for 24 hours. Next day, although conditions were still very far from ideal, the meteorologists predicted a temporary improvement; and on this basis the Supreme Commander took the heavy responsibility of deciding that the operation would proceed on the morning of the 6th.

Operation "Neptune" began shortly before midnight, when the R.A.F. commenced to pound the coastal batteries. Soon after midnight the men of the three airborne divisions began to land in Normandy. All were much more widely scattered than had been planned, but were nevertheless able to carry out their essential tasks, protecting the flanks of the seaborne landings and spreading confusion among the enemy. On the British side the 6th Airborne Division (which included a Canadian battalion) seized bridges over the Orne and the nearby canal intact, captured a coastal battery and carried out demolitions to cover this flank. With the coming of daylight the great bombardment of the beach defences began. Clouds forced the American bombers to do without direct observation, and their anxiety to avoid hitting the Allied landing craft resulted in many bombs coming down too far inland. The naval bombardment likewise scored direct hits on only a small proportion of the enemy positions. Yet this

terrific pounding of the whole defence area had a powerful moral effect on the Germans, and there is no doubt that it went far to enable the Allied troops to breach the Atlantic Wall at a much lower cost in casualties than had been expected. At many points Allied units got ashore without coming under really heavy fire, although fierce fighting was required afterwards to reduce strongpoints which the bombardment had not destroyed.

The roughness of the sea somewhat upset the timetable. Some of the craft carrying the special armour were late, some of the D.D. tanks could not be launched, and the infantry themselves were delayed in landing. Yet in general the attack went well, and before the morning was far advanced the Allied troops were pushing inland, by-passing the strongpoints that still held out. Nevertheless, stubborn German resistance kept them from attaining their final D Day objectives before evening at any point, except for a few Canadian tanks that reached them and then withdrew. The situation was worst in the "OMAHA" area, where there were German field troops and a steep coast. For two days the Americans had to fight desperately to keep a foothold, and casualties here were three times what they were elsewhere. The Canadian Division had 335 fatal casualties on D Day, somewhat fewer than had been expected.

The Allies had achieved strategic and even tactical surprise; that is, not only had the German high command had no time to reinforce the threatened area, but even the units holding it had no warning until our bombardment opened. However, the German reaction was rapid, even though there was delay in getting Hitler's permission to move some of the reserve panzer divisions. A tank counter-attack on D Day, although beaten back, helped to prevent the 3rd British Division from getting Caen. The next morning the 50th Division took Bayeux, and the 3rd Canadian Division got its right brigade on to the final objective* —the first brigade in the Second Army to do so; but the left brigade was struck by one of the reserve panzer divisions and driven back. The Germans regarded the Caen area from the beginning as the point of greatest danger and the pivot of their defence in Normandy. By throwing their reserves in piecemeal in that area as they came up, they temporarily stabilized the situation there; but they were never able to build up a striking force equal to delivering a large-scale counter-offensive and really threatening the Allied bridgehead. The

* *In this case, the Caen-Bayeux road and railway.*

movement of their reserves was most seriously hampered by the havoc which the air forces had wrought upon their communications, and by continuing air attacks; while the Allies, their sea communications protected by their navies and air forces, poured men and material into the bridgehead, hampered only by unseasonable bad weather. Above all, the Germans had been deceived into the belief that the main Allied attack was still to come—in the Pas de Calais; and there the Fifteenth Army, whose infantry divisions might have turned the scale in Normandy, sat idle while the British and American bridgehead was steadily built up.

Consolidation of the Bridgehead

The days following D Day were spent in linking the various Allied footholds into a continuous and secure lodgement area. With good naval and air support, the hard-pressed Americans on "OMAHA" gradually deepened their penetration and on 9 June they were able to take the offensive effectively. By that time the bridgeheads were linked up all along the front of assault except for a gap between the two American sectors near Carentan. Contact was made across this the next day, and after stiff fighting Carentan itself was captured on 12–13 June. On the British front the Germans went on throwing in fierce local armoured attacks; on 8 June, for instance, the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade beat off a serious threat and continued to hold its position on the final D Day objective. Caen remained in German hands, but the eastern flank of the bridgehead, though much more contracted than had been planned, was secure.

By 12 June the first phase of Operation "Overlord" had been successfully completed. The Allies had established a firm foothold on the Continent. Some 325,000 men, 55,000 vehicles and 105,000 tons of stores had already been brought ashore. The construction of the artificial harbours, on a more elaborate plan than that projected by COSSAC, was well advanced. The Germans' plan of defence had failed; they had not driven the invaders into the sea, and had now to prepare for their inevitable attempt to break out from the bridgehead.

Comments

By 1944 the western democracies, unprepared when war broke out, had built up their strength to the point where they could challenge the enemy with confidence. It seemed clear, however, that the only way of obtaining a rapid decision was by defeating the main German armies on a European battlefield. The

necessary preliminary to this was the crossing of the Channel and the establishment of a bridgehead, carried out in the teeth of strong defences and an experienced and determined enemy. This was such a hazardous operation that many good judges on the Allied side felt very uncertain about the outcome. That the invasion succeeded was due to the fact that the Allies were able to mobilize sea, land and air power on a vast scale, but even more to the fact that as a result of remarkably skilful and thorough planning they were able to use that power to the best advantage.

Every one of the accepted Principles of War is illustrated in Operation "Neptune." Eisenhower was told to enter Europe and "undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." The special aim in the assault phase was "to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed." These great simple objects were never lost sight of and formed the foundation of the whole plan, a good example of sound *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.* The ultimate object was achieved eleven months after D Day.

It is clear that the achievement of *Surprise* played a very great part in the initial success. The enemy was completely deceived as to the Allied intentions, and continued to grope in the dark long after D Day. This helped the Allies to effect a destructive *Concentration of Force* at the decisive point, while great German forces elsewhere waited for attacks that never came. The related principle of *Economy of Effort*, the result of "balanced employment of forces" and "judicious expenditure of all resources," is equally clearly illustrated.

Where could a better example of *Co-operation* be found than in "Neptune?" The victory won on the coast of Lower Normandy was the result of the efforts of the three fighting services of three different nations, working smoothly in combination under a Supreme Commander acknowledged to have a special genius for co-ordination. The point does not require to be laboured. "Goodwill and the desire to co-operate" paid their usual dividends, on this as on lesser occasions.

Similarly, it is clear that the Allied victory was largely a triumph of *Administration.* To get the invading force to France, and to maintain it when there, required, as we have seen, extraordinarily thorough administrative planning and a tremendous mobilization of human and material resources. The prefabricated harbours, brought across the Channel and assembled on the invasion coast, may stand as symbols of the admin-

istrative ingenuity which made such a great contribution to this epoch-making victory.

Other principles can be briefly dealt with. *Offensive Action* speaks for itself. "Neptune" is the very embodiment of it. As for *Maintenance of Morale*, only troops of high morale could have carried out the task, for it was actually more formidable in prospect than it turned out to be in reality; on the other hand, the famous Atlantic Wall once broken, success, as always, encouraged the Allied troops to push on to further victories. *Security* of the base and the lines of communication was well provided for by the navy, the air forces and the anti-aircraft gunners; however, as it turned out, the enemy was in no state to threaten them. Similarly, *Flexibility* was less important in this operation in that the plan as written succeeded so well; it appears chiefly in the use of those very flexible weapons, naval and air power, to support the troops ashore at any point during the bridgehead campaign where they found themselves hard pressed.

Books on the Campaign

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York, 1948), and *Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945* (London and Washington, 1946).

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery, *Normandy to the Baltic* (London, 1947).

Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack* ("United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations") (Washington, 1951).

Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, *Operation Victory* (London, 1947).

Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* (London, 1950).

Colonel C. P. Stacey, *Canada's Battle in Normandy* (Ottawa, 1946).

American Forces in Action Series: *Omaha Beachhead (6 June—13 June 1944)* (Washington, 1945) and *Utah Beach to Cherbourg (6 June—27 June 1944)* (Washington, 1947).

APPENDIX "A"

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Attempts have often been made to reduce the military experience of the past to the form of rules of action the observance of which may help to produce success in war. These rules have become known as the "Principles of War." Representing the distilled result of many men's study of many campaigns, they have been expressed in various forms in modern times. But while different writers may phrase and arrange them in different ways, there has been general agreement on the essentials.

The Principles of War, properly considered, are permanent and universal elements in warfare. Though their application alters with changes in weapons and tactics, the Principles themselves are as applicable to ancient as to modern campaigns. Moreover, although these Principles are often thought of as primarily strategical, they apply equally well in the field of tactics. Broadly speaking, these general rules are as applicable, or nearly as applicable, to the operations of an infantry section as they are to those of an Army Group.

All intelligent men will realize, of course, that it is out of the question to provide set rules whose observance will inevitably result in victory. Every student and every soldier will do well to keep before him the wise word of caution offered by the authors of *Field Service Regulations, 1935*, in presenting an official version of these principles: "Certain ideas as to strategical planning and conduct can be deduced from the experience of the past: they are often defined and expressed in the form of 'principles.' But it must be clearly understood that the principles that guide action in war, whether strategical or tactical, are not laws, such as the laws of natural science, where the observance of certain conditions produces an inevitable result, nor rules, such as the rules of a game, the breach of which entails a definite fixed penalty: they simply indicate a course of action that has been successful in the past and serve as a warning that disregard of them involves risk and has often brought failure. Many plans have, however, succeeded in war, although not made in accordance with textbook principles."

The Principles of War are printed below in the form adopted by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee for the use and guidance of the Canadian Armed Services.

* * *

Defining a principle as a guide to conduct, the following are the principles which must always influence a Commander in war:

1. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim

In the conduct of war as a whole and in every operation of war it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. *The ultimate aim is to break the enemy's will to fight.* Each phase of the war and each separate operation must be directed towards this supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim is decided, all efforts must be directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for a re-appreciation and consequently a new aim. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim.

The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim must be regarded as the "Master" Principle. It has therefore been placed first. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order, since their relative importance will vary according to the nature of the operation in question.

2. Maintenance of Morale

Success in war depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, skill and the bold offensive spirit which springs from a national determination to conquer. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are, therefore, essential to success in war.

3. Offensive Action

Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of victory; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken victory is impossible.

4. Security

A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate defence of vulnerable bases and other interests which are vital to the nation or the armed forces. Security does not imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success in war; on the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive.

5. Surprise

Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence in war, and its moral effect is very great. Every endeavour must be made to surprise the enemy, and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the effort expended can be obtained, and in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, tactically or by exploiting new material. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment,

deception, originality, audacity and rapidity.

6. Concentration of Force

To achieve success in war, it is essential to concentrate superior force, moral or material, to that of the enemy at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter the enemy's threats. Concentration is a matter more of time than of space.

7. Economy of Effort

Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces, and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.

8. Flexibility

Modern war demands a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. This entails good training, organization, discipline and staff work, and, above all, that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision on the part of both the Commander and his subordinates which ensures that time is never lost. It calls also for physical mobility of a high order, both strategically and tactically, so that our forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive places and times.

9. Co-operation

Co-operation is based on team spirit and entails the co-ordination of all units so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Above all, goodwill and the desire to co-operate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the services on one another and on the civilian war effort has made co-operation between them of vital importance in modern war.

10. Administration

The administrative arrangements must be designed to give the Commander the maximum freedom of action in carrying out any plan. Every administrative organization must be simple. Every operational Commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan within his sphere of command corresponding to the scope of his responsibilities for the operational plan.

APPENDIX "B"
GLOSSARY OF SOME BASIC TERMS COMMONLY USED IN MILITARY HISTORY

ADMINISTRATION: That function of command which deals with the *maintenance* of the forces in the field, involving the provision both of personnel and material.

BASE: A group of depots from which an army in the field is supplied with personnel and material. An army operating overseas maintains an *advanced* base (in or near the theatre of operations) as well as a *home* base in its own country.

COMBINED OPERATIONS: In British usage, 1939–45, operations involving more than one of the three fighting services. Often used with special application to AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (operations involving the landing of troops from the sea).

COMMUNICATIONS: Roads, railways, inland waterways, air routes, or any other facility in a theatre of operations suitable as a route for the movement of men, animals or material. The word is sometimes loosely used in place of INTERCOMMUNICATION, the military term for the various means of transmitting orders and information.

INTELLIGENCE: In military usage, primarily information *about the enemy*.

LINE(S) OF COMMUNICATION: The system of communications in a theatre of operations between the bases and the fighting formations, along which the requirements of the field army are transported.

LOGISTICS: Technically, the "art of moving and quartering troops" (*Oxford Dictionary*). Commonly used, particularly in the United States, as virtually equivalent to the British term ADMINISTRATION. An American definition is "that branch of military art that comprises everything relating to the movement and supply of troops."

MAINTENANCE: The process of keeping the forces in the field complete in personnel and material.

STRATEGY: The art of moving or disposing forces so as to impose upon the enemy the place, time and conditions for fighting preferred by oneself. The object of strategy is to ensure that when one's forces meet the enemy on the battlefield they will do so at an advantage.

GRAND STRATEGY: The art of applying the whole power of a nation (or a coalition of nations) in the most effective manner towards attaining the aim. It thus includes the use of diplomacy, economic pressure, arrangements with allies, the mobilization of industry and the distribution of manpower, as well as the employment of the three fighting services in combination. The term is conveniently used in connection with planning affecting operations in more than one theatre.

TACTICS: The art of directing forces in *contact* with the enemy; the conduct of operations on the actual battlefield.

APPENDIX "C"

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING

Books dealing with the particular episodes described in this pamphlet have been listed following the accounts of the campaigns and are not repeated here. The list below is designed to call attention to a few other books dealing with various subjects and campaigns which any Canadian student can read with profit.

This list is, of course, very far from exhaustive; there are many good books not included in it. But all the volumes in it might usefully find a place in every Canadian military library, and most large libraries will have them. Some are out of print, but can be obtained with a little trouble in the second-hand market. Specialized books on naval and air subjects have been omitted, not because it is not desirable that army officers should study them, for it is, but in the interest of keeping the list short. Regimental and corps histories and (with a few distinguished exceptions) the reminiscences of individuals, have also been omitted.

General and Miscellaneous

A. H. Burne, *The Art of War on Land* (London, Methuen, 1944).

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (various editions).

E. M. Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton University Press, 1944).

Sir J. Fortescue, *History of the British Army* (London, Macmillan, 13 vols. in 14 plus maps, 1899-1930).

D. S. Freeman, *R. E. Lee, A Biography* (New York, Scribner, 4 vols., 1935) and *Lee's Lieutenants, A Study in Command* (New York, Scribner, 3 vols., 1944).

J. F C. Fuller, *Armament and History* (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1946).

Sir E. B. Hamley. *The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated* (new ed., Edinburgh & London, Blackwood, 1923).

G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War* (one-volume edition, New York, Longmans, 1936) and *The Science of War* (London, Longmans, 1905).

Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War* (various editions).

Sir H. Richmond, *British Strategy, Military & Economic* (Cambridge University Press, 1944).

E. W. Sheppard, *A Short History of the British Army* (new ed., London, Constable, 1950).

O. L. Spaulding, *The United States Army in War and Peace* (New York, Putnam, 1937).

C. P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada* (Toronto, Ryerson, 1940).

M. F. Steele, *American Campaigns* (Washington, U.S. Infantry Association, 2 vols., 1943).

Earl Wavell, *Generals and Generalship* (London, Times Publishing Co., 1941; reprinted in the same author's *The Good Soldier*, London, Macmillan, 1948).

K. P. Williams, *Lincoln Finds A General* (New York, Macmillan, 2 vols. published, 1949).

First World War

C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations, Gallipoli* (*History of the Great War based on Official Documents:* London, Heinemann, 2 vols. plus maps, 1929).

C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *A History of the Great War, 1914-1918* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934).

Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis* (one-volume edition, New York, Scribner, 1931).

A. F. Duguid, *Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-1919* (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1938) (only one vol., with appendix vol., published).

Sir J. E. Edmonds, *A Short History of World War I* (London, Oxford Press, 1951).

B. H. Liddell Hart, *The War in Outline, 1914-1918* (New York, Random House, 1936).

Sewell Tyng, *The Campaign of the Marne, 1914* (London, Oxford Press, 1935).

Earl Wavell, *The Palestine Campaigns* (London, Constable, 1928) and *Allenby, Soldier and Statesman* (London, Harrap, 1946).

Second World War

Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War* (Toronto, Allen; 5 vols: published, 1948-51).

Cyril Falls, *The Second World War, A Short History* (London, Methuen, 1948).

Eric Linklater, *The Campaign in Italy* ("The Second World War, 1939–1945: A Popular Military History by Various Authors") (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1951).

Viscount Montgomery, *El Alamein to the River Sangro* (London, Hutchinson, 1946).

R. E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, Harper, 1948).

C. P. Stacey, *The Canadian Army 1939-1945* (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1948).

H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1950).

Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (London, Collins, 1952).

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